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Over the past two decades, we have witnessed a rise in "privatization" -
a conversion from the operation of certain businesses by nonprofit and gov-
ernment entities to the operation of these businesses by for-profit companies.'
Privatization has occurred within a variety of different industries, including
correctional facilities, insurance agencies, health care, and most recently, edu-
cation.2 The growing number of for-profit conversions3 has sparked consider-
able debate regarding the propriety of altering the previously not-for-profit4
structure that characterized these industries to one that assumes a for-profit
form. Supporters tout the advantages of privatization, claiming that, among
other things, conversions will provide much needed resources as well as
greater efficiency to these industries. Critics raise a variety of objections
ranging from the for-profit corporation's inability to provide effective services
1. Some have construed the term "privatization" broadly to include any increased gov-
ernmental or nonprofit reliance on the private sector. See, e.g., E.S. Savas, Privatization &
Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REv. 889, 889 (1987) (defining privatization as "increased governmental
reliance on the private sector... to satisfy the needs of society"); Lewis D. Solomon, Reflec-
tions on the Future ofBusiness Organizations, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 1213, 1215 (1999) [here-
inafter Solomon, Reflections] (defining privatization as act "of increasing the role of the private
sector, in an activity"). This Article defines the term more narrowly to refer to the transfer of
ownership or assets from the public/government sector to the private sector. See, e.g., Mary M.
Shirley, The What Why, & How ofPrivatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23, 24 (1992) (defining privatization as "the transfer of ownership of assets to the private
sector").
2. See infra note 15 (discussing extension of privatization across various industries).
3. This Article uses the terms "privatization" and "conversion" or "for-profit conversion"
interchangeably.
4. This Article uses the term "not-for-profit" to refer to all public entities including non-
profit and governmental entities.
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to claims that privatization may erode important civic values.' However, the
rallying cry for many opponents of privatization is that "Wall Street and profit
maximization" have no place in certain sectors of our society.6 This cry stems
from the philosophical belief that the for-profit corporation's principal goal
is maximizing shareholder wealth and that this goal is wholly incompatible
with the social and charitable core missions of many not-for-profit industries.7
Nowhere is this cry more strident than in the context of privatization within
industries that deliver important services to the public, such as health care or
education." Opponents contend that once a for-profit conversion occurs, the
social or charitable commitments of certain industries inevitably are subverted
to the corporate director's obligation to maximize shareholder value."
Against this backdrop stands a debate within the corporate community
that should influence the debate regarding privatization. Indeed, corporate
scholars disagree about the theory that should provide standards for the
actions of for-profit corporations and their directors. Some corporate scholars
5. See infra Part LD (discussing philosophical objections to privatization).
6. See, e.g., Philip P. Bisesi, Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Entities to For-Profit
Status, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 805, 845 (1997) (quoting Rhode Island legislator George D. Caruolo
who argued that "Wall Straet and the maximization of profits would have no place in the world
of health care"), Ad Hoc Comm. to Defend Health Care, For Our Patients, Not for Profit: A
Call To Action, 278 JAMA 1733, 1733 (1997) (stating that "companies responsive to Wall
Street and indifferent to Main Stree" are taking over nonprofit hospitals).
7. See, e.g., Bradford H. Gray&WalterMcNemey,For-ProfitEnterprise in Healthcare:
The Institute ofMedicalStudy, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1523, 1524 (1986) (noting that "[s]ome
objections to for-profit health care stem from the belief that it is fundamentally inconsistent with
the values and purpose that should animate health care organizations").
8. See id. (noting objection that for-profit healthcare is "fundamentally inconsistent with
the values and purpose that should animate health care organizations"); see also John Green-
wald, Schoolfor Profit Private Companies Can Run Public Schools, But Can TheyMake Them
Pay?, TIME, Mar. 20, 2000, at 56 (noting that "the very notion [of for-profit public schools]
seems heretical"); Peter Schrag, Edison's Red Ink Schoolhouse - The Biggest Brand Name in
For-Profit Education Is Floundering, NATION, June 25, 2001, at 20 (noting, "what the critics
most dislike - is simply the idea that somebody is trying to turn public education into a profit-
making enterprise"); William C. Symonds, Edison: Pass, Not Fail, Bus. WK., July 9,2001, at
70 [hereinafter Symonds, Edison Pass] (noting that parents, teachers, and activists who defeated
one private school's attempt to operate schools in New York all believed that such schools were
out to "profiteer from poor children"); Edward Wyatt, Higher Scores Aren't Cure-All, School
Run for Profit Learns, N.Y. TIEs, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Wyatt, Higher Scores]
(noting that "mostly [opponents of privatized education] promoted a single principle: profit-
seeking companies should stay out of public education").
9. See, e.g., Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reform, 23 J. CoRP. L. 631, 641 (1998) ("For
profit directors and officers are principally concerned about long-term profit maximization.
While nonprofit directors and officers keep economic matters in mind, they are principally
concerned about the effective performance of the nonprofits' mission.").
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favor the "social entity"' conception of the corporation - that the corporation
and its directors should serve the interests of the various constituencies the
corporation impacts. These scholars claim that certain critical Delaware court
decisions, as well as the passage of so-called "constituency" statutes" that
permit directors to take into account a variety of different interests in perform-
ing their management duties, have signaled a shift away from the traditional
notion that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder profit. 2 Others
dispute this claim. Instead, they argue that corporate jurisprudence continues
to subscribe to the traditional "shareholder-primacy" conception of the corpo-
ration that maximizing the wealth of shareholders should be the primary, if not
10. Scholars have referred to this concept in a variety of different ways including a
"corporate enterprise" concept and the "stakeholder" model. All refer to the notion that a
corporate model that considers a broader set of interests should displace the traditional share-
holder-centered model of the corporation.
11. As Professor Eric W. Orts observed, the manner in which one refers to these statutes
often reveals on which side of the debate a person falls with respect to the propriety of these
statutes. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 14, 16 (1992) (suggesting that choice of label for statute
conveys favor or disfavor). Those who favor the statutes refer to them as "stakeholder" statutes,
based on the notion that a variety of different groups have a stake in the corporation and that
these statutes promote consideration of their interests. Some have objected to this label because
it implies that these groups have some financial stake in the corporation, when only sharehold-
ers hold such an interest. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1425
n.6 (1993) (suggesting that "stakeholder" incorrectly implies that constituency has financial
interest in firm). Others who oppose such legislation refer to them as "nonshareholder" statutes.
Like Professor Orts, this Article will use the relatively neutral title of "constituency statutes" to
describe those provisions that explicitly allow corporate directors and officers to consider
interests other than those strictly related to the shareholders. See Orts, supra, at 18 (proposing
"neutral label is conveniently short and comports with the avowed purpose of the statute to
include... interests beyond those of the shareholder").
12. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corpora-
tion, 14 CARDozO L. REV. 261, 264-73 (1992) (analyzing "property" and "social entity"
conceptions of corporate law). After reviewing the changes in Delaware law and the enactment
of the corporate "stakeholder" statutes by various states, Allen, former chancellor of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, concludes that "ultimately both our courts and, more importantly,
our legislatures have, in effect, endorsed the entity view." Id. at 276. Chancellor Allen notes,
"stealing is still proscribed and self-dealing transactions still have to be justified as fair to the
corporation, but what arguably is eradicated is the command ... that maximizing the financial
interests of shareholders through lawful means over some time period is the core duty of a
corporate director." Id. at 276-77; see also Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders:
Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1411-12
(1993) (arguing that existence of constituency statutes reflects erosion of shareholder-primacy
norm); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865,911 (1990) (noting judicial change away from recognition
of shareholder-primacy concept); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV.
223, 240 (1991) (proposing that "judicial and legislative restrictions on hostile takeovers
suggest at least a partial willingness to subordinate shareholder to non-shareholder interests").
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exclusive, aim of the corporation.'" The resolution of this corporate law
debate may shed light on the validity of the arguments against privatization.
Indeed, if the shareholder primacy model remains dominant, then opponents
of privatization may have a well-founded concern that directors of a for-profit
corporation cannot consider sufficiently the interests of other constituents
because of their duty to increase the profits of their shareholders. However,
if the social entity model has gained acceptance, then this concern may be
groundless.
By evaluating the extent to which current corporate law allows directors
of recently privatized firms to make decisions that benefit their public constit-
uencies, even at the expense of shareholder profit, this Article approaches the
corporate law debate through the prism of privatization. 4 In bringing these
two issues together, this Article serves dual purposes. First, this Article fills
an important gap in the privatization debate by analyzing the corporate law
conceptions upon which the opponents of privatization base their philosophi-
cal objections. This analysis focuses on health care and education. Because
critics raise the strongest philosophical objection to privatization of these
industries, examining the validity of the objection in the context of these
industries provides a useful test as to its validity more generally. Second, this
Article provides some insight into the relative prominence of the two positions
regarding the aims of corporate law.
Part I of this Article examines the trend towards privatization in the edu-
cation and health care fields, the forces behind the trend, and the philosophical
opposition to privatization in these areas. Part II elaborates on the social
entity and shareholder primacy theories of the corporation. Part III addresses
the evolution of the fiduciary duty of directors and the impact this evolution
has had on the relative prominence of the two theories of the firm, as well as
the possible effect of this evolution on the actions of directors in these post-
conversion entities. Part mI also evaluates constituency statutes and the
degree to which the statutes allow directors greater flexibility to make deci-
sions that serve the interests of non-shareholders. The bulk of this Article
focuses on the extent to which corporate law allows or requires directors to
consider particular interests in performing their duties. Part IV takes up the
13. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1424-25 (noting that mainstream of corporate
law remains committed to shareholder maximization norm); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoreti-
cal andPracticalFrameworkforEnforcing ConstituencyStatutes, 70 TFX. L. REV. 579, 586-87
(1992) (noting that practice of equating shareholder interests with those of corporation has
remained largely intact).
14. This Article seeks only to analyze the constraints placed on director conduct by
directors' fiduciary duties. It does not seek to assess the extent to which other forces, such as
the stock market or shareholder voting, may impact directors' conduct towards shareholders and
non-shareholders.
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separate issue of the kind of decisions that directors of post-conversion
entities actually will make by analyzing the empirical evidence related to the
behavior of companies after their conversion.
This Article concludes that opponents of privatization base their philo-
sophical objection to privatization on a theoretical conception of the for-profit
corporation that is more myth than reality. In fact, a review of the current
status of the for-profit director's duties reveals that the social entity model of
the corporation governs most of a director's decision-making. This means that
corporate law allows directors of post-conversion companies to take actions
that advance the interests of their beneficiaries, even when those actions fail
to generate the maximum level of shareholder profit. Hence, opponents of
privatization are laboring under a misconception about the aims of the corpo-
ration, and to the extent that they base their objections to privatization on this
misconception, their objections do not have much force. Moreover, there is
empirical evidence to support the notion that, in practice, directors of post-
conversion corporations have behaved in a manner consistent with the social
entity model of the corporation. This evidence, buttressed by the current
status of corporate law, undercuts the force of the philosophical objection to
privatization. It also suggests that the social entity model may have taken
center stage in our conception of the corporation.
L Conversions into For-Profit Firms
Although there have been conversions in many other fields," this Article
focuses on those that occur in connection with hospitals and entities that
deliver K-12 education. 6 While privatization generally has sparked contro-
15. In addition to health care and education, the practice of privatization has extended to
insurance companies, public works and transportation, emergency medical services, the criminal
justice system, the public welfare system, and correctional facilities. See, e.g., Savas, supra note
1, at 890 (discussing privatization trends in various areas). See generally Michele Estrin Gilman,
LegalAccountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REv. 569 (2001) (discussing
privatization of social welfare programs); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REv. 1165 (1999) (discussing privatization of policing responsibilities). One of the biggest
industries to experiment with privatization has been the prison industry. For a discussion of this
phenomenon, see generally ADRIAN L. JAMES ET AL, PRIVATIZINo PRISONS: RHETORIC AND
REA=Y (1997) (discussing privatization of prisons in Britain); PRIVATIZINO CORRECnONAL
INSTITUTIONS (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993) (discussing financing, construction, and man-
agement of prisons); W.J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional
Institutions: The Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REv. 829 (1987) (discussing history of
prison privatization in Tennessee); Peter J. Duitsman, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private
Sector Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REv. 2209 (1998) (discussing privatization
as solution to overcrowding); Savas, supra note I (discussing cost effectiveness of private
prisons).
16. This Article refers to post-conversion corporations in these fields as "public benefit"
corporations.
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versy, conversions related to hospitals and K-12 education generate the
greatest level of controversy primarily because opponents believe that the
uncompromised delivery of the services required in these industries poses the
greatest challenge for the directors of the for-profit corporation."7 Before
discussing this controversy, this Article discusses the growth of privatization
in these industries and the manner in which it occurs.
A. "The Largest Reform Ever": Hospital Conversions
In the 1990s, the health care industry experienced a dramatic change,
with one commentator even calling it "one of the largest reforms ever to have
occurred in any industry in the United States.,"1  In 1995 alone, more than
$1.6 billion in not-for-profit healthcare assets were sold to the private sector. 9
In addition to the changes in the ownership structure for health maintenance
organizations (HMOs)2" and health care insurers, such as Blue Cross and Blue
Shield,2 the number of hospitals converting from public or nonprofit status
17. See infra Part 1.D (discussing philosophical objections to privatization).
18. Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal Response
to Hospitals' Changes in Charitable States, 23 AM. J.L. & MD. 221, 225 (1997); see also
Bisesi, supra note 6, at 805 ("A revolution has descended upon the health care industry.");
James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the Con-
version of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 J. CORP. L. 701,702
(1998) ("[T]he United States has witnessed the largest redeployment of charitable assets in the
Anglo-American world since Henry VII closed the monasteries in 1536-1540."). Although
hospital conversions have occurred throughout the nation, the heaviest concentration has been
in California, Florida, Georgia, and Texas. Jack Needleman et al., Hospital Conversion Trends,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 187 [hereinafter Needleman, Conversion Trends].
19. Shelley A. Sackett, Conversion of Not-For-Profit Health Care Providers: A Proposal
For Federal Guidelines on Mandated Charitable Foundations, 10 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 247,
250 (1999).
20. In 1995, approximately 70% ofHMOs were for-profit, see Gary Claxton et al., Public
Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An Overview, HEALTH AFP., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 9, 13-
15, as compared to approximately 20% in 1981, Bisesi, supra note 6, at 823. For a discussion
of conversions related to HMOs, see generally Theresa McMahon, Fair Value? The Conversion
of Nonprofit HMOs, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 355 (1996) (analyzing conversion process of one
California HMO).
21. Five Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans have converted, or are trying to convert, to for-
profit status while forty-seven operate for-profit subsidiaries. Bisesi, supra note 6, at 823. For
a discussion of conversions related to Blue Cross and Blue Shield, see id. at 823-25 (discussing
increase in mergers and conversions of such plans), See also JACK NEEDLEMAN, NONPROFIT TO
FoR-PRoFiT CONVERSIONS IN HEALTH CARE: A REViEw 23-24 (Pioneer Inst. for Pub. Pol'y
Res., White Paper No. 5, 1999) (citing "access to capital and entrepreneurship" as driving force
behind conversions) [hereinafterNEEDEMAN, CONVERSION REVIEW]; Sackett, supra note 19,
at 253-55 (discussing reasons why plans convert); L.D. Schaeffer, Health Plan Conversions:
The View from Blue Cross of California, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 183-87 (analyzing con-
version of Blue Cross California).
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to for-profit status increased significantly during this period. As compared to
previous years, the number of hospitals converting to for-profit status in 1994
almost quadrupled, going from approximately nine per year to thirty-four in
1994, and then to fifty-nine in 1995.1 Because of these changes, for-profit
hospitals currently account for 15% of the total number of hospitals.23
Privatization occurs in connection with hospitals in a variety of ways,24
but the common denominator is that the not-for-profit enterprise loses its
ownership and control over the hospital. The most typical conversion mecha-
nism is an asset sale pursuant to which the for-profit corporation purchases the
assets of the not-for-profit organization.' Upon distribution of the assets, the
nonprofit entity dissolves, while the for-profit entity survives as owner and
operator of the hospital.2 In other cases, a nonprofit entity may merge into
a for-profit corporation with the for-profit corporation as the surviving
entity." In other settings, not-for-profit hospitals do not necessarily change
forms; rather, the hospitals participate in joint ventures with for-profit entities
22. Claxton, supra note 20, at 12. Despite this overall increase in the number of hospital
conversions, the total percentage of for-profit hospitals has been relatively constant over the past
twenty years. See David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fac4 Fantasy, and Regulation
Follies, 23 J. CoRP. L. 741,749-54 (1998) (analyzing data showing stability of percentage of for-
profit hospitals).
23. Hyman, supra note 22, at 749.
24. This includes an asset sale, a merger or consolidation, a "drop down" conversion, a
"conversion in place," or a joint-venture transaction. See Fishman, supra note 18, at 714-15
(explaining different conversion mechanisms); Singer, supra note 18, at 232-34 (same).
25. See Fishman, supra note 18, at 714 (describing asset sale as "typical for the aquisition
of a non-profit hospital by a for-profit acquirer"); Sackett, supra note 19, at 248 n.2 (describing
asset sale to for-profit entity as "typical" conversion), Singer, supra note 18, at 232 (referring
to asset sales as "Type A" conversions).
26. Tax laws require that a tax-exempt organization dedicate its assets to a charitable
purpose upon dissolution. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1(dX3) (1996). To accomplish this, once
the conversion occurs, the nonprofit transfers the sale proceeds and any remaining assets to
another charitable organization, usually a foundation. To comply with the tax rules, use of these
sale proceeds must be consistent with both the nonprofits original mission and the historical
uses of its assets.
The tax laws also provide that no portion of a nonprofit's net earnings shall inure to the
benefit of a private shareholder or individual and that no insider, such as a director or officer,
shall receive a substantial economic benefit as a result of the nonprofit's activities. See I.R.C.
§ 501(cX3) (1996) (private investment rule); Tress. Reg. § 1.501(a)-I (1997) (private inurement
rule); Tress. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1(dXl) (1996) (private benefit rule). If the converted assets are
not sold at fair market value and the owners of the post-conversion entity include managers of
the former nonprofit, the IRS could deem the managers to have received a profit from the sale
and hence to have violated the private inurement or private benefit doctrine. Because of this
problem, the IRS instituted a new rule imposing an excise tax sanction on those who violate the
tax laws through undervaluation of these conversions. See generally Fishman, supra note 18,
at 727-29 (describing IRS response to violation of private investment and benefit doctrines).
27. See Singer, supra note 18, at 232-33 (discussing various methods of conversion).
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pursuant to which a new company is formed whose purpose it is to offer
hospital services." Such hospitals contribute assets to the newly formed
company in exchange for cash and a small interest in the new venture, while
the for-profit company contributes cash in exchange for a larger interest in the
venture.
29
Three of the largest for-profit corporations that own hospitals are HCA-
The Healthcare Co., formerly Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. (HCA); Uni-
versil Health Services, Inc. (UHS); and Tenet Healthcare Corp. (Tenet)."
HCA, formerly Columbia Hospital, was formed in 1987, and within ten years
it owned 350 hospitals" As of December 2000, HCA operated 196 hospitals
in twenty-four states. 32 In 1995, UHS operated twenty-nine hospitals; it cur-
rently operates fifty-nine hospitals in twelve states. 3 Tenet, headquartered in
California, grew from thirty-five hospitals in 1994, to 11l hospitals in seven-
teen states in the year 2000.34 All of these entities manage hospitals, delivering
health care services to millions of patients nationwide every year. Moreover,
all of these entities have shareholders who expect a profit on their investment.
While several forces led to the explosion in privatization of hospitals, 5
one of the most significant catalysts was the hospitals' need for capital infu-
sion.3 Rising health care costs, coupled with the constraints on nonprofits'
28. See Bisesi, supra note 6, at 830; Claxton, supra note 20, at 9; Singer, supra note 18,
at 233-34.
29. Typically, the nonprofit entity receives an ownership interest equal to 20% of the new
venture. See Bisesi, supra note 6, at 830.
30. See Sean Nicholson et al., Measuring CommunityBenefitsProvided by For Profit and
Nonprofit Hospitals, HEALTHAFF., Nov.-Dec., 2000, at 168, 172-73 (analyzing financial data
of HCA, UHS, and Tenet).
31. Fishman, supra note 18, at 709.
32. HCA-THE HEALTHCARE CORP.,2000 ANNUAL REPORT, 2 [hereinafter HCAANNuAL
REPORT]. Prior to 1997, HCA grew through a series of mergers and acquisitions. Id. at 3. In
July of 1997, prompted by federal investigations, HCA restructured its operations and signifi-
cantly reduced the number of hospitals it owned and operated. See id.
33. UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INc., PROSPECTUS, May 10, 2001, at 4 [hereinafter
UHS PRospEcTus].
34. See TENET HEALTHCARE CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 1.
35. Other reasons for the growth in privatization include a belief that the nonprofit hos-
pital could not remain competitive and the benefits of economies of scale. See NEEDLEMAN,
CONVERSION REVIEW, supra note 21, at 19-23 (citing financial distress, need for capital
improvements, and fear of loss of market share); Bisesi, supra note 6, at 821 (noting that decline
in inpatient admissions contributed to privatization movement by creating fewer resources for
hospitals); Fishman, supra note 18, at 713 (citing ability to pursue lobby activity and consoli-
date); Claxton, supra note 20, at 13-15 (citing efficiency, market share and growth strategies,
reduced regulatory constraints, and potential benefits for managers).
36. "Increasingly, nonprofit tax-exempt'hospitals have come to believe that they are at a
significant disadvantage vis-&-vis their for-profit brethren in their ability to attract the capital
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ability to raise funding, created pressure to convert to for-profit status. These
increased costs stemmed from decreases in federal reimbursements related to
Medicare, a reduction in inpatient admissions, and limits imposed by managed
care ranging from reductions in bed days to decreases in referrals. 7 Unfortu-
nately, nonprofit hospitals were unable to access the capital necessary to meet
these rising costs. Traditionally, nonprofit hospitals raised money through
donations and tax-exempt bonds.3 Hospitals issued these bonds at a lower
interest rate, resulting in a lower cost of capital for hospitals, while placing
them at a competitive advantage in terms of financing.39 However, changes
in the health-care industry and bond ratings have reduced this competitive
advantage. Moreover, federal tax laws impose use restrictions on the funds
borrowed by nonprofits, further curtailing the growth of large nonprofit
hospitals.' Unconstrained by such laws, the for-profit sector can raise money
through public offerings and other arrangements unavailable to nonprofits.
Therefore, when hospital costs began to rise, nonprofit hospitals increasingly
found themselves searching for additional capital; forging an alliance with the
for-profit sector appeared to be a welcome solution.
B. Students for Sale?: The Privatization of Education
It was only a matter of time before the privatization wave encompassed
K-12 education, one of the last major industries controlled by the public
sector. While nonprofit41 schools continue to dominate the educational
needed to compete in the market." Singer, supra note 18, at 221-22; see also Fishman, supra
note 18, at 713 (noting access to capital as fundamental reason for conversion); Sackett, supra
note 19, at 250 ("A principal factor motivating many not-for-profits to convert is an increased
need for access to capital in order to compete with for-profit entities.").
37. Although, historically, the federal government fully reimbursed hospitals for costs
related to the care of Medicare recipients, in 1991, Medicare instituted a fixed-payment reim-
bursement system resulting in lower levels of hospital reimbursements. Singer, supra note 18,
at 225; see also Bisesi, supra note 6, at 820-21 (noting increased pressure placed on hospitals
because of managed care organizations discounts, reduction in Medicare and Medicaid reim-
bursements, and decline in inpatient admissions).
38. See Fishman, supra note 18, at 713 (discussing use of tax exempt financing by hos-
pitals); Singer, supra note 18, at 226-27 (discussing tax exempt financing as key source of
capital for hospitals).
39. See Singer, supra note 18, at 226-27 (discussing competitive advantages of tax-
exempt financing).
40. See id. at 227 (discussing limits of Tax Reform Act of 1986). The restrictions limit
the amount of funds a hospital may raise through tax-exempt financing for non-hospital
purposes, such as administrative costs. See 26 U.S.C. § 145 (1996) (limiting face value of non-
hospital bonds to $150,000).
41. This Article uses the term "nonprofit" as applied to companies that manage schools
to refer to public schools as well as private schools organized as nonprofits.
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arena,4 2 for-profit education has made notable inroads. 43 Revenues from for-
profit education companies account for about 10% of the total amount spent
on education.44 The number of public schools operated by for-profits has
grown steadily. In fact, while today there are approximately 250 for-profit
public schools serving more than 120,000 students, these schools did not exist
a decade ago. 45 As of the fall of 2001, the largest for-profit provider of K-12
education has a total enrollment larger than the local school system in Boston
or San Francisco.'
Privatization in the K-12 arena takes place in one oftwo ways. For-profit
companies either directly operate public charter schools or contract with local
school districts or charter school boards to manage particular schools in
exchange for funding based on the number of students enrolled at the
schools.47 For-profit managers of education initially entered the K-12 market
by contracting directly with school boards to operate local public schools
within their district.4 However, this route proved challenging. 49 The passage
42. See F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter, What Does Private Management Offer
Public Education?, 1I STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 271,271 (2000) (discussing competitive disad-
vantage of for-profit schools); Jay Mathews, New School of Thought: Making Education Pay;
For-Profit Initiative Has Backing, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2000, at El (noting that for-profit
companies run only 250 ofall 80,000 public schools).
43. In addition to K-1 2 education, these companies also operate tutoring centers, corporate
training seminars, colleges, and schools devoted to early child care. For example, Sylvan
Learning Systems operates the largest network of tutoring centers, while the University of
Phoenix is the largest for-profit college. See, e.g., Lisa (ryboski, PA Colleges Bemoan Entrance
of For-Profits, MORNING CALL, June 17, 1998, at Al (referring to the University of Phoenix as
"leader" of for-profit collegiate movement). In addition, Columbia University and several other
educational and cultural institutions, including the University of Michigan and the University
of Chicago, host a for-profit web site, http://www.fathom.com, that provides information
regarding on-line courses, lectures, and other educational endeavors. See Sarah Carr & Vincent
Kiernan, For-Profit Web Venture Seeks to Replicate the University Experience Online, CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 14,2000, atA59 (discussing on-line collaboration of Columbia Univer-
sity with other institutions).
44. William C. Symonds, Industry Outlook 2000: Services, Bus. WK., Jan. 10, 2000, at
138 [hereinafter Symonds, Outlook].
45. See Greenwald, supra note 8, at 56 (discussing rapid expansion of for-profit schools).
46. See Symonds, Edison Pass, supra note 8 (noting that with schools serving some
75,000 pupils, Edison will be larger than the Boston or San Francisco system); William C.
Symonds et al., How to Fix America's Schools, Bus. WK., Mar. 19, 2001, at 66 [hereinafter
Symonds, Fixing America's Schools].
47. In fact, the bulk, if not all, of the funds these private companies receive comes from
public sources. See, e.g., EDISON SCHooLS, INC., PROSPECTUS, Mar. 20,2001, at 18-19 [here-
inafter EDISON PROSPECTUS] (noting that it receives all of its revenue from public sources and
that it derives funding from special state and federal programs such as Title I of Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, which earmarks funds for low income families).
48. See Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42, at 271 (discussing history of for-profit
schools' entry into market). Education Alternatives, Inc., now the Tesseract Group, Inc. (Tes-
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of charter school legislation provided a second alternative for private compa-
nies seeking access to the public schools. Such legislation, currently enacted
in thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia,5° and Puerto Rico"i authorizes
local school boards or other governmental bodies to grant charters for the
creation and operation of public charter schools. The schools operate inde-
pendently of the state public school system, although they continue to be
subject to some state and federal regulation 52 Under their charter school
legislation, some states allow the granting of a charter directly to a private
entity, and for-profit companies thus manage schools pursuant to a contract
with the granting agent. Other states do not permit the granting of charters to
seract), became the first private firm to manage a public school board when it contracted with
the Dade County, Florida school board in June of 1990. See Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of
For-Profit Corporations in Revitalizing Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U.
ToL. L. REv. 883, 900-03 (1993) (discussing "Tesseract" model in public sector). However,
because of controversies related to inflated attendance records and misrepresented test scores,
Dade County eventually chose not to renew its contract. Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42,
at 271-72. Others who experimented with for-profit education also encountered difficulties,
resulting in the termination of the earlier contracts. See id (discussing contract terminations in
Minneapolis, Minnesota and Wilkesboro, Pennsylvania).
49. See Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42, at 271-72 (discussing early contract diffi-
culties with local school boards).
50. These states include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. THE CTR. FOR EDUC. RE-
FORM, CHARTER SCHOOL HIGHLIGHTS AND STATISTICS [hereinafter CHARTER SCHOOL HIGH-
UGHTS], available at httpJ/edreform.com/puba/chglance.htm. Pursuant to this legislation, over
500,000 students are enrolled currently in over 2,000 charter schools. Id. Minnesota passed
the first charter school in 1991 with California following suit in 1992. See Judith Johnson &
Alex Medler, The Conceptual and Practical Development of Charter Schools, I I STAN. L. &
PoL'Y REv. 291,293 (2000) (discussing history of charter schools).
51. See Jonathan S. Rosenberg, Education Law Institute 2001, Current and Emerging
Issues in Special Education: Charter Schools, 96 PL/NY 813, 816 (2001) (including Puerto
Rico).
52. All private entities that run public schools continue to be subject to some state and
federal regulation. See Frank R. Kemerer & Catherine Maloney, The Legal Framework for
Educational Privatization andAccountability, W. EDUC. L. REP., Mar. 29, 2001, at 589-605
(discussing constitutional and regulatory restrictions on private educational entities). Charter
schools are also subject to oversight from the body granting their charter. See id. at 609-21 (dis-
cussing accountability mechanisms). After studying the states operating the most for-profit
charter schools, one group of researchers concluded that the private entities that operate charter
schools are "subject to considerable accountability." Id. at 609. Arizona, Massachusetts, and
Michigan are the states with the most charter schools operated by for-profit companies. Id. The
study found that at least in Michigan and Massachusetts, the schools were subject to the same
requirements as public schools with regard to teacher certification, fiscal oversight, student
assessment, and periodic reporting. See id. at 619 (discussing impact of legal framework on
autonomy of private entities operating charter schools).
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private firms. In these states, private firms operate charter schools via sub-
contracts, pursuant to which they enter into an agreement for management of
the charter school with a third party that holds the charter.5 3
Spearheading the movement into for-profit education is Edison Schools,
Inc. (Edison), which at the time of this writing, is the largest for-profit
operator of K-12 schools. 4 Since opening its first four schools in 1995,"
Edison has grown steadily and became one of a select few of these compa-
nies with publicly traded stock 6 when it hosted its initial public offering in
1999." As of the 2001-2002 school year, Edison manages 136 public
schools in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia."8 Edison serves
53. See id. at 606 (discussing "contract model" of privatization); Solomon, supra note 48,
at 891-92 (same).
54. See e.g., Symonds, Edison Pass, supra note 8, at 70 ("Right now, [Edison] is the
leader by every measure in the nascent business."). Edison is the brainchild of Christopher
Whittle, who serves as its CEO. Whittle's first for-profit educational venture was Channel One,
a program of news and commercials in the classroom, which he sold in 1994 for $300 million.
Mathews, supra note 42. In addition, the current chairman of Edison, Benno Schmidt, Jr., left
his position as president of Yale University to participate in the Edison Project. William
Raspberry, Can Whittle Save the Schools?, WASH. POST, June 8, 1992, at Al 9.
55. EDISON PROSPECTUS, supra note 47, at 43.
56. See Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42, at 272 (noting that few private education-
management companies trade publicly). Only two other companies, Tesseract and Nobel Learn-
ing Communities, Inc. (Nobel), trade publicly. Id. at 273. However, Tesseract, previously
Education Alternatives, Inc., filed for Chapter I I in October 2000. See THE TESSERACT GROUP,
INC., CURRENT REPORT, FORM 8K, Oct. 6, 2000 (reporting bankruptcy to SEC). Other for-
profit entities involved with charter schools include SABIS Educational Systems, Advantage
Schools, The Leona Group, Beacon School Management, Mosaic, and National Heritage
Academy. Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42, at 272.
57. Edison's initial public offering in November 1999 raised more than $100 million,
although the listing price of $18 per share was below the expected $25 per share. See, e.g.,
Symonds, Outlook; supra note 44, at 138 (analyzing increased investor interest in for-profit
education); Mathews, supra note 42 (discussing Wall Street's backing of Edison); Edward
Wyatt et al., Education Pays Off Royally, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1999, at B 15 (noting results of
Edison's 1999 IPO). Edison has not shown a profit since its inception, but it reported its first
quarter of positive cash flow at the end of 1999. Mathews, supra note 42. Since 1999, Edison
has had two secondary offerings: in August 2000 and in March 2001. Edison raised approxi-
mately $71 million in its August 2000 offering and another $81 million in the March 2001
offering. EDISON SCHOOLS, INC., QUARTERLY REPORT, FORM 8K, Mar. 31,2001, at 6-7.
58. This is an increase from 113 public school operated by Edison at the end of the 2000-
01 school year. EDISON PROSPECTUS, supra note 47, at 43; see also Edison Schools to Buy
Rival School Manager for $36 Million in Stock, WALL ST. J., June 5, 200,1 at B6 [hereinafter
Edison to Buy Rival (reporting on Edison's first acquisition); Symonds, Edison Pass, supra
note 8, at 70 (discussing Edison's rapid growth). Given Edison's acquisition of LeamNow,
Inc., another for-profit manager of schools, it likely will continue to expand in the future. See
Edison Completes LearnNow Deal, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2001, at B5 (reporting likely comple-
tion of Edison's acquisition of LeamNow). By comparison, Tesseract operated fifteen schools,
which included eleven charter schools and four private schools. Hal Mattem, School Changing
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approximately 75,000 students.59
A belief that the private sector can do a better job of delivering quality
education than their public counterpart has fueled the growth in privatized
education. As one private management company's annual report states:
Education is a politically "hot issue," both nationally and in many local
areas. The broad public debate has shifted from whether our existing K-1 2
system has failed in terms of performance to which reform movements
promise the best and quickest improvements. 60
Because of their additional resources and nationwide support system, for-
profit educators believe that their programs offer benefits that public school
systems camot.6 Along with private vouchers, home-schooling, and charter
schools, the private management of public schools represents one of the
alternatives to what the American public has begun to believe is the failing
governmental school system.
In addition to the relative dissatisfaction with public schools, the growing
amount of venture capital money available to these companies fueled the
growth of for-profit education. Indeed, a small but distinct group of venture
capitalists enthusiastically has embraced for-profit educational endeavors.62
Hands; Tesseract Trying to Stop Bleeding, ARIZ. REP., May 24, 2000, at DI. Nobel operates
171 private schools in fifteen states, the bulk of which (close to 150) are pre-elementary
schools. Id.; see also NOBELLEARNINO COMMUNrIEs,INC.,2000 ANNUAL REPORT I [hereinaf-
ter NOBEL ANNUAL REPORT] (providing statistical overview of business); Oreenwald, supra note
8, at 56 (noting that as of March, 2000, 145 of Nobel's schools were pre-elementary).
59. This is compared to the 57,000 students served in the 2000-2001 school year.
Symonds, Edison Pass, supra note 8, at 4. Of those 57,000 students served, approximately
41,400 were in grades pre-K-5, 12,600 were in grades 6-8, and 2,800 were in grades 9-12.
EDISON PROSPECTUS, supra note 47, at 43. By comparison, Nobel serves approximately 28,000
students. NOBEL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 1.
60. NOBEL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 10. As one commentator noted, "[E]du-
cation is the last big bastion of the economy largely controlled by the government. And given
how poor a job the government has done, it's no wonder the private sector is rushing in."
Symonds, Outlook, supra note 44, at'138; see also Alexis Moore, As Debate Rages, For-Profit
Charter Schools Move Forward, STAR-LEDOER, Feb. 6, 2000, at 8 (claiming that "[i]nvestors
seem to believe that these companies can turn at least part of the nation's multibillion-dollar
education sector from nonprofit institutions into consolidated, money-making businesses").
61. For example, Edison schools offer longer days and school years combined with an
emphasis on technology and foreign language skills. Edison believes that it can invest in the
future and exploit advantages of scale in a manner that public schools cannot See EDISON
PROSPECTUS, supra note 47, at 43-44 (promoting Edison's competitive advantage over public
schools).
62. See, e.g., Greenwald, supra note 8, at 56 (noting that "venture capitalists from Wall
Street to Silicon Valley are eagerly pumping funds into educational start-ups"). One market-
research firm estimated that, from 1998 to 1999, the amount of private-venture capital money
available to education startups quadrupled to $3.3 billion and predicted that in 2000 that
number would increase to $4 billion. See Symonds, Outlook supra note 44, at 138 (comment-
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For example, several major Wall Street firms, such as Smith Barney and
Montgomery Securities, have created investment literature designed to en-
courage participation in the K- 12 education market.63 Also, one private equity
fund, with a management team that includes the former governor of Massa-
chusetts and two former U.S. Secretaries of Education, has emerged with an
exclusive focus on for-profit education, raising over $150 million to support
these endeavors.' Similarly, Edison received over $300 million from such
sources.
65
The creation of charter schools also accounts for the increase in for-profit
education. As two researchers noted, "the charter school movement gave new
life to the concept [of privately managed public schools]."" The number of
charter schools with for-profit operators accounts for about 12% of all charter
schools. 7 In some states, the number of privately managed charter schools is
ing on research performed by Eduventures.com). Similarly, in 1997, Kohlberg Kravis & Co.
paid $609 million for Kindercare, an entity that provides curriculum materials for pre-school
and kindergarten children in learning centers. Kendra Wall, Investors Go Back to School,
UPSIDE MAo., Oct. 1, 2000, at 253, 255. Fortsmann Little led a $35 million investment round
in Caella University, a for-profit university that offers web-based courses and certifications. Id.
at 255. Acceptance of this opportunity is not widespread among investors and many express
reservations about the risk of the investment. See Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42, at 273
(noting that "many of the education entrepreneurs in the K-12 market have not convinced the
investment community that they will deliver a strong return on investment").
63. See Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42, at 272-73 (describing investment literature
of securities firms, which notes, among other things, that revenue stream is "predictable and
guaranteed" and that student population shows "continued growth").
64. See Avital Louria Hahn, An Educational Niche and a Former Governor Help Leeds
Weld Master the Game: Private Equity Firm Has Much of the For-Profit Education Market
to Itself, INVESTMENT DEAm DIG., Mar. 5, 2001 (reporting on Leeds Weld entry into for-
profit schools investment sector). In early 2001,' former Massachusetts governor William Weld
became a board member and general partner of Leeds Weld & Co. (Leeds), formerly known as
Leeds Equity Partners, and expressed a belief that for-profit education could solve many of the
problems in the public school. Id. The advisory board for Leeds includes both Lamar Alexan-
der and Richard Riley. Id.
65. See Mathews, supra note 42 (noting that Edison received over $350 million from
major investors). Leeds invested some $45 million dollars in Edison. Wall, supra note 62.
Edison also benefits from the support of philanthropic organizations. See Ann Grimes, School
Board Seeks to Revoke Edison Charter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2001, at B1 (explaining that
California philanthropic organization "pledged $25 million to California districts that work with
Edison and donated $1.8 million to the Edison Charter Academy").
66. Nelson & Van Meter, supra note 42, at 272; see also Moore, supra note 60 (noting
that "[flor-profit education-management companies interested in opening alternative schools
are doing so by way of charter-school movement"X Symonds, Outlook, supra note 44, at 138
(noting that for-profit schools - through the charter school movement - "are riding the biggest
reform wave in American education").
67. See Frank Kemerer & Catherine Maloney, The Legal Framework for Educational
Privatization andAccountability, 150 EDUC. L. REP. 589,605 (2001). This is up 2% from 2000
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quite significant." In fact, researchers estimate that private, for-profit, man-
agement companies operate at least 70% of Michigan's charter schools.69
Also, one Philadelphia school district, considered one of the worst in the
country, hired three for-profit companies, including Edison, to operate all of
the schools within its district.7 As the number of charter schools grows, the
number of schools with for-profit operators -probably will grow as well.
C. The Resistance
The shift toward for-profit delivery of education and hospital services has
encountered considerable opposition. In the health care context, state attor-
neys general and other community groups challenged for-profit conversions
both before and after they occurred." However, many of these efforts proved
unsuccessful. 2 In the wake of these defeats, opponents focused on securing
legislation to regulate the conversion process.73 Currently, thirty-five states
when 10% of the 1,700 charter schools were run by for-profit organizations. See Moore, supra
note 60.
68. Kemerer and Maloney found that the permissive nature of some state charter laws
accounted for the high number of privately operated charter schools. Kemerer & Maloney,
supra note 67, at 609. In Arizona, for example, individuals as well as public and private entities
may apply for charters, teachers do not need to be certified, and the state has no collective
bargaining. Moreover, the Arizona laws exempt charter schools from the state rules governing
other public schools. Amidst this clearly hospitable climate, for-profit education in Arizona via
the charter school has flourished. Id at 160. Not only is Arizona the current host of the largest
number of charter schools, see CHARTER SCHOOL HIGHIUGHTS, supra note 50 (charting number
of charter schools by state), but many of these schools are operated by privately-managed
companies. See THE TESSERACT GROUP, INC.,QUARTERLY REPORT, Mar. 31,2000, at 8 [herein-
after TESSERAcT QUARTERLY REPORT] (noting significant revenue from Arizona).
69. See, e.g., JERRY HORN & GARY MIRON, EVALUATION OF THE MICHIGAN PUBUC
ACADEMY INIIATIVE 98 (1999) (indicating jump in use of for-profit management companies
by charter schools); Kemerer & Maloney, supra note 67, at 609 (observing that about 70% of
Michigan academies are operated by educational management organizations); Nelson & Van
Meter supra note 42, at 272 (noting high use of for-profit companies in Michigan).
70. See Brent Staples, A Case of Radical Surgery on Failing Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2001, at A14 (noting that district in Chester has performed so poorly that school board had
considered dissolving and dispersing its students to surrounding school districts).
71. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 18, at 236-37 (describing several "high profile" chal-
lenges to hospital conversions).
72. In fact, some have argued that this conversion is inevitable. See Sackett, supra note
19, at 247 (arguing that conversions are natural consequences of inadequacies in health care and
that "flat opposition to for-profit health care provision is a waste of resources and time").
73. Indeed, members of Congress have proposed legislation providing for significant
federal oversight of the conversion of tax-exempt hospitals. Additionally, several states have
introduced bills creating monitoring procedures for the conversion of hospitals into for-profit
entities. Sackett, supra note 19, at 251-52; see also Bissei, supra note 6, at 833-37 (noting
meeting of attorneys general that sparked action aimed at overseeing conversion process as well
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have considered or passed legislation aimed at regulating hospital conver-
sions. 4 These statutes typically require notification to, or approval of the
conversion by, the state attorney general. The attorney general reviews the
process, focusing on a variety of factors including the payment of fair value
for the hospital assets, the potential for the continuance of charitable care
post-conversion, and the prevention of any conflicts of interests.
A similar kind of opposition confronted the movement towards for-profit
education.76 In April 2001, New York parents and teachers successfully
opposed Edison's attempt to take over five public schools. 7 The San Fran-
cisco school board strenuously opposed Edison's management of some of its
schools," although Edison ultimately was successful. 9 Moreover, opponents
of privatization in education have a strong ally in the teachers' unions whose
as state oversight that resulted from meeting); Singer, supra note 18, at 222 n.9 (listing various
states' legislation related to conversion process); id. at 240 (explaining state laws aimed at
monitoring conversion process).
74. See, e.g., Kevin F. Donohue, Crossroads in Hospital Conversions - A Survey of
Nonprofit Hospital Conversion Legislation, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 63 (1999) (noting
number of states that had considered or enacted legislation governing conversions).
75. See id. at 67-69 (explaining that conversion requires Attorney General's approval),
see also Singer, supra note 18, at 241 (noting requirement that state attorneys general review
conversion). Concerns in the hospital conversion context are similar to concerns in the takeover
context that directors will attempt to profit from self-dealing. See e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting "omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests"). State legislators recognize that nonprofit conversions
create significant risks of self-dealing by directors and much of the legislation has been aimed
at thwarting this behavior. Id.
76. Indeed, charter schools in general have encountered considerable opposition, in-
cluding constitutional challenges. See, e.g., BRYAN C. HASsE , Tim CHARTER SCHOOL CHAL-
LENGE 21-30 (1999) (noting controversy surrounding charter schools); Andrew Broy, Charter
Schools andEducationReform: How State Constitutional Challenges WillAlter CharterSchool
Legislation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 493, 533-49 (2001) (detailing legal challenges to charter schools);
Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563,602-15
(2001) (discussing possible constitutional challenges to charter schools); Karla A. Turekian,
Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform: The Legality of Charter Schools, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 1365, 1383-93 (1997) (explaining legal issues facing charter schools); Note, The
Hazards of Making Public Schooling a Private Business, 112 HARV. L. REV. 695 (1999)
(detailing challenges faced by private companies running private education). Because many of
the for-profit educators operate charter schools, any attack on these schools necessarily will
undermine the privatization efforts in this arena.
77. See Edison to BuyRival, supra note 58; Lynette Holloway, Parents Explain Resound-
ing Rejection of Privatization at 5 Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13,2001, at BI (explaining why
parents voted against Edison proposal).
78. See Grimes, supra note 65 (detailing opposition to Edison in San Francisco).
79. In July 2001, the school district agreed to discontinue its efforts to revoke Edison's
charter and allow Edison to apply for renewal of its charter. See Edward Wyatt, California
Battle Over Charter School Ends, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,2001, at A12.
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members often act in concert with parents and community leaders to resist
efforts by the local school board or charter authority to privatize their schools.
Highlighting this fact, Edison's prospectus notes that "we regularly encounter
resistance from teachers' unions in local school board debates over whether
to enter into a management agreement with us."' In a few instances, unions
brought litigation against Edison to prevent Edison's entrance into their public
school system." While these efforts have not derailed the conversion process
completely, they have been able to slow it down considerably."2
D. The Philosophical Objection
Opponents raise many objections to the privatization of these industries."3
Generally, the crux of their concern is that the core mission of hospitals and
K- 12 educators is antithetical to the corporate goal of increasing the wealth
of its shareholders.84 At least two underlying premises are embedded in this
objection.
8 5
The first one encompasses a belief that the services provided by the
public school system and hospitals are essential. Healthcare represents a
critical, life-and-death service. Public hospitals historically provided health
80. EDISON PROSPECTUS, supra note 47, at 12. The fact that these labor unions have such
a strong impact on the conversion process may confirm many observations that other constituent
groups do not need directors to take into account their interests because they have organizations
to protect them, while shareholders' sole protector is the directors.
81. See id. at 12 (noting that teachers' unions occasionally challenge management agree-
ments in court). For example, the Baltimore teachers' union filed suit seeking to void Edison's
contract to operate three elementary schools. Eric Siegel, School Pact Draws Suit, BALT. SUN,
Apr. 21,2000, at lB.
82. For example, Edison's New York contract was rejected, while the controversy in San
Francisco lasted for months. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (explaining actions
of unions in opposing privatization). Based on the experience in health care, one may predict
that this opposition will subside and the focus will shift toward increased regulation of the
conversions and the behavior of these for-profit enterprises post-conversion.
83. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 48, at 920-25 (citing arguments raised by critics
including argument that privatization may block common educational experiences, erode civic
equality, and promote commercial products as well as improper values); Julie Huston Vallarelli,
Note, State Constitutional Restraints on the Privatization of Education, 72 B.U. L. REV. 381,
382-83 (1992) (discussing belief that privatized education benefits wealthy and hastens white
flight).
84. See Hyman, supra note 22, at 744-45 (explaining that philosophical bias in favor of
nonprofit hospitals reflects view that for-profits will not provide community benefits); Sackett,
supra note 19, at 250 (noting that nonprofit boards have fiduciary duty to their charitable
purpose, while for-profit boards owe duty to shareholders); Wyatt, Higher Scores, supra note
8 (noting that what appears to underlie objections of Edison opponents is philosophical
opposition to school run by for-profit company); Grimes, supra note 65 (noting that school
officials are most bothered by fact that public funds are spent on profit-making endeavors).
85. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text (discussing premises).
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care to those who lacked the ability to, pay for it. 6 While today's public
hospitals may have strayed from their more charitable roots,' many continue
to adhere to the notion that public hospitals have a fundamental responsibility
to provide health care and other benefits to those in need. 8 Similarly, K-12
education represents a critical service. Early education significantly impacts
the lives of the students by providing them with the skills necessary to survive,
prosper, and even participate in a democratic society."9 Moreover, like their
86. See, e.g., NEEDLEMAN, CONVERSIoN REVIEW, supra note 21, at 12 (noting that his-
torically, while well-off were treated at home or by family members, early hospitals treated only
poor, transient, or those without family support); Fishman, supra note 18, at 703 (noting that
"from the time of Elizabethan Statute of Uses" nonprofit hospitals have served as symbol of
charitable healthcare provider); Sackett, supra note 19, at 248 (stating that "American hospitals
have a long history of providing charitable care").
87. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 18, at 704 (noting that modem changes have made
notion of voluntary hospital into myth); Hyman, supra note 22, at 758-60 (noting that empirical
evidence "provides disheartening news to those who believe nonprofit hospitals are particularly
virtuous"). Indeed, while federal law previously required that tax exempt hospitals provide free
care directly to indigents, changes in the tax laws have relaxed the standard considerably so that
hospitals are not required to provide free care or even a full-time emergency room. See I.R.S.
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (redefining charitable care requirement to "community
benefit" standard). For a discussion of this change, see generally Nina J. Crinmm, Evolutionary
Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regen-
eration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 40-46 (1995) (noting change from
narrow construction of term "charitable care," which limits exemption to hospitals that provide
free or reduced-cost care to indigents, to broader construction, which includes all hospitals that
provide benefits to community, even if such hospitals fail to provide free health care); Sackett,
supra note 19, at 248-49 (explaining move from charitable care for indigents to community
benefits, including "medical research, training, and teaching").
88. See, e.g., Stuart Auerbach, Managed Care Backlash, WASH. POST, June 25, 1996, at
Z12 ("The switch to medicine-for-profit clashes with the outdated but still-cherished national
myth of community-based nonprofit hospitals .... This is an idealized picture of medicine in
the United States, but its comforting image is firmly placed in the national psyche.").
89. Education is important for both political and social reasons. See, e.g., J. TUsSMAN,
GOVERNMENT AND THE MlND (1977) (noting that public schools should shape students into
good citizens); Michael B. Katz, The Present Moment in Educational Reform, 41 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 342, 355 (1971) (noting that public schools are asked to check immorality and create
sense of community); Solomon, supra note 48, at 920 (arguing that critics of privatization view
schools as places in which "children from all walks of life come together" as productive
citizens); Nat Stern, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curricular Material: Rights of
Students and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485, 492-93 (1979) (noting socialization
aspect of public schools); Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public
Functions: Politics, Profit and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323,336-39 (1999) (noting that
education is important public service distinct from traditional services provided by corpora-
tions); Mark 0. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression
and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 878 (1979) (noting that "public school teachers
are charged with instilling values to a captive audience"). The Supreme Court also has recog-
nized the unique nature of the public school. See'Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)
("Public schools are the most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system
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ideas about public hospitals, many Americans have a "traditional concept of
a public school system in which the local public sector assumes complete
responsibility for providing education to every (or nearly every) school-age
child."90 Thus, the presumption that both the hospital and the public school
system are responsible for providing essential services is deeply embedded in
the American psyche.
The second premise embedded in the objection to privatization is that the
for-profit corporation runs counter to the special mission of these industries.
This premise also appears to have firm roots in our society.9' In fact, critics
within both industries express a deep-seated philosophical objection to for-
profit management. Professor David Hyman notes, "It is clear that there is a
widespread 'philosophical bias' in favor of the nonprofit form for hospitals."'
Opponents believe that the profit-maximizing aim of for-profit hospitals
prevents post-conversion hospitals from serving the community and providing
access to healthcare to all those in need.93 The following captures this senti-
ment:
Nonprofit and for-profit administrative boards differ in the character of
their fiduciary duties.... [NIonprofits have a fiduciary duty to the organi-
zation's charitable purpose and benefit to the public.... Once converted,
however, the board of a for-profit maintains a fiduciary duty to sharehold-
ers. This duty requires them to operate the hospital so as to generate
returns on shareholder investment."
This perceived difference between the duties of directors in a nonprofit
and for-profit corporation appears to be at the heart of the objection to hospi-
tal conversions and also animates the opposition in the education arena. Thus,
one commentator notes that while some have asserted other reasons for their
opposition to privatized education, "what appears to underlie their objections
is a philosophical opposition to a school run by a company whose purpose is
of government.") (internal citations omitted); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J. concurring) ("It is implicit in the history and character of American
public education that the public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of
American citizens.. . ."); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments."); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (noting that public schools are "educating the
young for citizenship").
90. Solomon, supra note 48, at 920.
91. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (explaining bias toward non-profit
hospitals).
92. Hyman, supra note 22, at 744.
93. See, e.g., Gray & McNerney, supra note 7, at 1524 (noting conflict between making
profit and treating indigent patients; Sackett, supra note 19, at 247 (noting that health care
community views changes to for-profit hospital cam with "considerable alarm").
94. Sackett, supra note 19, at 250.
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to earn a profit."95 Parents, teachers, and legislators express a singular con-
cern that the very nature of the for-profit corporation demands that the stu-
dents' interests be subordinated to those of shareholders.' These groups
argue that companies like Edison will cut comers in a variety of large and
small ways that will harm school children. Capturing this belief, Professor
Lewis Solomon, who questioned the merits of the objections to privatized
education, explained the critics' concerns as follows:
If a for-profit ownership venture experiences a bad year, will it close one
or more schools before the end of a school year, thereby stranding students,
or will the squeeze on profits lead to a compromise on quality? Would
profitmaking entities exploit children to maximize profits by: using low
quality text, supplies, meals; hiring cheaper, less competent teachers;
inflating grades to foster the illusion of academic achievement or ignoring
children with special needs?9'
These questions illustrate the belief that the duties of for-profit directors
and the missions of public benefit corporations are at polar opposites. Based
on this view, conversions into for-profit firms will cause the welfare of
students, like that of patients, to fall victim to profitability concerns. How-
ever, this assessment is based on a particular conception of the for-profit
corporation. If the conception is not accurate, then the suggestion about the
probable responses of directors within these corporations may be inaccurate
95. Wyatt, Higher Scores, supra note 8.
96. Interviews of teachers and parents who oppose efforts to privatize public education
reveal that nearly all have concerns about the priorities of corporations like Edison. See, e.g.,
Grimes, supra note 65 (noting that president of San Francisco school board, who launched
campaign to revoke Edison's charter at San Francisco elementary school, claimed philosophi-
cal opposition to for-profit management of public schools); Holloway, supra note 77 (noting
New York parents fear that their children would be used as guinea pigs in business experi-
ment); Moore, supra note 60 ("Parents and educators who have fought granting charters to
such [for-profit] companies often express a philosophical objection to the idea of a for-profit's
performing a traditionally nonprofit function."); Rene Sanchez, Edison School Project
Growing Slowly: Public Education Venture, Entering Third Year, Has Yet to Make Profit,
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1997, at A03 (noting that "[m]any school districts are still reluctant to
work with . . . for-profit group[s] trying to manage public schools, because they doubt the
companies will be able to profit without taking budget shortcuts that may not be beneficial to
students"); Edward Wyatt & Abby Goodnough, As Bid to Privatize Schools Ends, Supporters
Second-Guess Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at 132 (noting community's concern that
children would be reduced to dollar signs). This kind of sentiment has existed since the
inception of schools like Edison. See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 42 (commenting that since
its inception, educators have been concerned that while Channel One "might make money...
[it] would not help kids" ).
97. Solomon, supra note 48, at 924. Professor Solomon responds to these concerns and
concludes that for-profit corporations may create competition within the public educational
system that will force the development and implementation of more efficient and creative
schools. Id. at 925-26.
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as well. Evaluating corporate law in the context of privatization will help
determine the merits of the shareholder-dominated conception of corporate
law and, in turn, the merits of such an objection to privatization.
Ii. Analyzing the Two Models of Corporate Thought
As Chancellor Allen, formerly ofthe Delaware Court of Chancery, wrote,
"our society has been schizophrenic on the subject of corporation law for a
long time.""8 Indeed, two seemingly inconsistent conceptions of the business
corporation - one that views the corporation as a profit-maximizing machine
and the other that recognizes the corporation's responsibility for addressing
the concerns of all its constituents, including employees, customers, creditors,
and similar groups - have dominated our thinking about directors' objectives.
The first, and more conventional, understanding of the corporation,
referred to herein as the "shareholder primacy" model, is that the corporation
exists in order to maximize the value of the shareholder's interests." This
conception of the corporation was justified first by the notion that sharehold-
ers are the property owners of the corporation and, therefore, are entitled to
legal protection of their property - their invested capital."° In their classic
book, Adolf Berle and Gardner Means described the arrangement between the
corporate directors and shareholders as analogous to a trust relationship, in
which the directors hold the shareholders' property in trust for the sharehold-
ers' benefit.1"' Because of this relationship, directors owed a duty of undi-
vided loyalty to the shareholders to enhance the value of shareholders' prop-
erty. More recently, scholars have offered a different rationale for the corpora-
tion's focus on the shareholder. 2 This justification, influenced by neoclassi-
98. Allen, supra note 12, at 264.
99. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367-69 (arguing that corporations exists exclusively to make profits for
shareholders); Millon, supra note 12, at 228-29 (noting that "modem view of the corporation
as an engine for shareholder wealth maximization" arose around turn of twentieth century).
100. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATIONAND
PRiVATE PROPERTY 9 (1932) (referring to shareholders as "owners"and noting that corporate
governance must focus on the problems caused by the separation of ownership and control);
Millon, supra note 12, at 229-30 (explaining idea that shareholders hold corporations as
property); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 33 (stating that corporate executives are employees
of shareholders).
101. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 100, at 119-95 (presenting trust model of corporate
law); see also William W. Bratton, Berie & Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J.
CORP. L. 737, 762-765 (2001) (explaining Berle and Means trust model).
102. Several scholars have advanced and discussed the contractual view of the corporation.
See generally Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, AntTakeover Amendments, Managerial
Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985);
Lucien Amye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
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cal economic analysis,0 3 starts from the presumption that a corporation is
essentially a web of contractual relations forming a "nexus of contracts.""°
Under this view, contracts govern the rights of both shareholders and non-
shareholders. The directors' relationship with the shareholders is a contract
pursuant to which the director serves as the shareholders' agent. However,
because the interests of directors and shareholders are not always aligned,
legal rules must ensure that directors do not shirk their responsibilities to
shareholders in favor of their own interests."° Thus, implicit in the contract
between directors and shareholders is an understanding that directors have a
legal duty to promote the shareholders' interest over those of other groups."°
This preference for shareholders' interests is justified because non-
shareholders have alternative mechanisms, unavailable to shareholders, by
which they can influence the corporation. Indeed, contracts govern the rights
of groups, such as employees and creditors, and these contracts can be altered
to the extent that they fail to protect the groups' interests. 07 Even privately-
managed schools are governed by contracts that place restrictions and affirma-
tive obligations on the treatment of students."as Moreover, powerful interest
groups often represent and promote the concerns of these other corporate
constituents. Most notably, labor unions often have considerable influence
over managerial decision-making. For example, not only did labor unions
play a crucial role in the passage of constituency statutes," but they also
REV. 1395 (1989); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO.
MASONL. REV. 99 (1989); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND.
L. REV. 1259 (1982). For a critique of this theory, see William W. Bratton, The "Nexus of Con-
tracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELLL. REv. 407,432-64 (1989) (explaining
deficiencies in contract theory).
103. See Bratton, supra note 101, at 415-16 (explaining neoclassical foundation of con-
tractual theory of firm).
104. See id. at 432-64 (explaining contract theory).
105. See Millon, supra note 12, at 232 (noting that legal rules are used to enforce duties
to shareholders). Proponents of the contractual view of the corporation refer to the problem that
managers may shirk their duty to shareholders or engage in other forms of misbehavior as
agency costs. Id. at 231-32; see also Bratton, supra note 101, at 418 (mentioning legal rules
against self-dealing).
106. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 12, at 232-33 (detailing "explanation for shareholders'
legal right to insist on management's exclusive fidelity to their interests").
107. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analsis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON
L. REv. 23,23 (1991) (mentioning contractual duties between groups). In Katz v. OakIndus-
tries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986), Chancellor Allen explained that groups, such
as creditors, must look to contracts for protection of their rights.
108. See Grimes, supra note 65 (noting details of Edison's contract with San Francisco).
109. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1444 (noting that "from the shareholders'
perspective, the unions helped kill the goose that laid the golden egg").
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currently play a pivotal role in determining whether for-profit education will
gain acceptance." 0 Because shareholders have relatively little external influ-
ence over the corporation, it is appropriate that directors consider their inter-
ests above those of other constituent groups. Thus, the shareholder primacy
model is not only descriptively accurate, but also is the normatively appropri-
ate model of the corporation.
The second conception, referred to herein as the "social entity model,"
sees the modem corporation as a social institution that should consider the
interests of all of the groups it impacts."' Proponents of this model argue that
employees and creditors who invest either their services or their capital in the
firm are as much a part of the firm as shareholders and have a stake in the
future position of the corporation."' In their view, the corporation consists of
a variety of different relationships. As managers of the entire corporate
enterprise, directors have a duty to enhance the interests of every group within
that enterprise.' Embedded in the social entity theory is a notion of corpo-
rate social responsibility.1 ' Because the modem corporation has the power
and resources to impact those outside interests significantly, managers have
a responsibility to consider the interests of many groups in society when
carrying out their duties.' Ultimately, shareholders are just one group among
many to whom directors have a responsibility.
Critics of the social entity model complain that the model fails to provide
a solution for what Professor Stephen Bainbridge calls the "two masters" and
"managerial sins" problems."" The two masters problem refers to the notion
110. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing unions' role).
111. Most scholars refer to this conception as the "stakeholder" theory of the corporation.
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation,
87 Nw. U. L. REv. 180, 208-15 (1992) (outlining stakeholder theory); Timothy L. Fort, The
Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NoTRE DAw L. REv. 173,184-86 (1997) (detailing stake-
holders theory); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 54 (1999) (explaining popularity of stakeholder theory);
John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management and
the TrialogicalImperativefor Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1465-69 (1994 (noting
stakeholder theory).
112. See, e.g.,WnLAMM. EVAN, ORGANIZATIONTHEORY: REsEARcHAND DESIGN362-63
(1993) (discussing interests that groups have in corporations).
113. See Fort, supra note 111, at 184-85 (noting manager's duty to stakeholders).
114. See id. at 185 (explaining directors' duties to stakeholders, including local community
and stating that stakeholders affected by corporate decisions "ought to participate in the
decisions that substantially affect them"); Hess, supra note 111, at 52-53 (noting that stake-
holder theory includes notion that corporations impact many groups and, thus, corporation's
managers must have responsibilities for those groups).
115. See Hess, supra note 11, at 52-53 (explaining duties of corporation to public).
116. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1435-42 (outlining issues surrounding two masters
and managerial sins problems).
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that while the interests of shareholders and other groups often coincide, oc-
casionally it is impossible for directors to pursue the concerns of all groups."'
The shareholder primacy model resolves this problem by requiring corporate
directors to fivor the shareholder. However, because the social entity model
does not have such a requirement, that model provides no satisfactory resolu-
tion to this problem."" The second problem, which inevitably flows from the
first, refers to the idea that by insulating directors' decisions even when they
have no appreciable benefit for shareholders, the social entity model allows
managers to fiurther their own personal interests without any accountability." 9
Under the shareholder primacy model, to the extent that a director's decision
is not beneficial to shareholders, shareholders have the right to sue the director,
and this right operates as a check against self-interested behavior. However,
the social entity model does not require directors' actions to be beneficial to
shareholders in order to be legitimate. Hence, it will be easier for directors to
pretend their actions were designed to benefit one of several groups even when
they were motivated by more self-centered concerns. 2 '
117. Others have also complained of the two masters problem. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra
note 13, at 589 ("The spectre is raised of a board of directors blindly groping to balance the
conflicting interests of a variety of constituent groups without any means of measuring the
interests required to be considered or of assessing the relative priorities of such interests.");
James J. Hanks, Jr., Non-Stockholder Constituency Statues: An Idea Whose Time Should Never
Have Come, INSIGHTfs, Dec. 1989, at 20,24-25 (explaining difficulties directors face in dealing
with multiple stakeholders).
118. Proponents of the social entity model argue that directors have been entrusted with
the discretion to make difficult decisions in the past, and, thus, we should have confidence that
they will be able to weigh competing interests and come to a satisfactory resolution. See, e.g.,
Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Gover-
nance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1418 (1993) (referring to social entity theory as "stake-
holder" or multi-fiduciary" theory of firm, and noting that objections to this theory fail to
account for fact that we currently expect directors to weigh competing obligation when they
make decisions). They also argue that we should have confidence that our judiciary will devel-
op adequate principles to govern the behavior of directors in this area. Id. at 1419.
119. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &DANIEL R. ISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrUt OF
CORPORATE LAw 38 (1991) (commenting that "a manager told to serve two masters (a little for
the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to
neither"). This problem reflects the accountability concern expressed by many opponents of
constituency statutes. See, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald: Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating
Corporate Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 J. CoRP. L. 1, 2 (1998) (noting.
that constituency statutes "create a class of managers whose decisions are utterly discretionary").
Professor Bainbridge recognizes that the tremendous discretion afforded director's decisions by
the business judgment rule often allows 'irectors to make decisions that further their own
interests. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 1439-41. However, he maintains that under the social
entity model there is no limit to such actions because, while currently directors' decisions must
be related at least plausibly to the shareholders' interests, under the social entity model, directors
can play various groups against one another to maximize their own concerns. Id. at 1438.
120. This Article does not seek to further the normative debate relating to these two con-
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X11 Corporate Law Principles
Under current law, courts typically scrutinize directors' duties based
upon the context in which their decisions are made, 12 distinguishing between
those made in the ordinary course of business and those made in the context
of a takeover or other fundamental change of control of the corporation.
Courts review the former decisions under a deferential standard. The latter
decisions receive more exacting judicial scrutiny. This section will explore
decisions made in both contexts as well as the impact of constituency statutes
on those decisions."n
A. Ordinary Business Decisions
1. Status of the Law
In the early part of the nineteenth century, the traditional view that the
directors of a for-profit corporation owed a duty exclusively to the share-
ceptions of the corporation, but rather seeks a more descriptive response to the status of our
conception of the corporation.
121. Courts also apply separate standards for decisions tainted by self-dealing and those
unencumbered by any conflicts of interests. Self-dealing decisions implicate the duty of loy-
alty, and courts generally require them to be intrinsically fair to the corporation. Historically,
the law either prohibited directors from being involved in a conflict of interest transaction or
allowed these transactions to be voidable at the option of the corporation. See, e.g., Potter v.
Sanitary Co. of Am., 194 A. 87, 91 (Del. 1937) (advancing rule of per se voidability). Today,
a conflict of interest transaction will be upheld as long as it is fair to the corporation or it has
received approval by a majority of the disinterested shareholders or directors. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. Tit 8, § 144(aX3) (1999); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 (Del. 1987)
(upholding conflict of interest transactions as long as they are intrinsically fair to corporation);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (stating that conflict of interest
transaction is only upheld if transaction is fair, which involves both fair price and full disclo-
sure to shareholders). Virtually all states, including Delaware, have a statute providing for
approval of a conflict of interest transaction. See Michael Bradley & Cindy Schipani, The
Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26
n.159 (1989) (discussing statutes). Decisions made outside of the self-dealing context implicate
the duty of care and are generally subject to a lower standard of review. This Article focuses
on conduct implicating the duty of care.
122. This discussion, particularly as it relates to business decisions made during a change
of control, will focus primarily on Delaware law because that state continues to be considered
at the vanguard of corporate law. More than half of the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated
in Delaware. R. Cammon Turner, Shareholders vs. The World, BUS. L. TODAY, Feb. 1999, at
32, 34; see also S. Samuel Arsht, A History ofDelawuare Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1, 1 (1976) (noting Delaware corporate law is "the most popular of such laws in the United
States"). Also, the two largest for-profit education companies, Edison and Nobel, are Delaware
companies. EDISON PROSPECTUS, supra note 47, at 1; NOBELANNAL REPORT, supra note 58,
at 1. Moreover, two of the largest providers of for-profit healthcare, HCA and UHS, are both
Delaware corporations. UHS PRosPECTUS, supra note 33, at 1; HCA ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 32, at 1. Hence, Delaware law will govern decisions made by their directors.
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holders guided directors' decisions and judicial review of those decisions."2
Under corporate law, directors manage the affairs of the corporation, and their
management must be consistent with the best interests of the corporation.'24
Consistent with the shareholder primacy, model, courts construed this duty to
the corporation as one owed to the shareholders, requiring directors to act in
the best interests of shareholders by maximizing their profit.'25
The oft-cited 1919 Michigan Supreme Court decision, Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.,'26 captures this conventional expression of the directors' obliga-
tions. '27 In that case, the Dodge brothers, who owned approximately 10% of
the stock of the Ford Motor Company (FMC), sued the directors of FMC
based on the directors' decision to suspend the payment of special dividends.
Henry Ford, chairman of the board and a majority stockholder of FMC, had
refused to pay the dividends because he wanted to retain the company's
profits to expand the business and make affordable cars for the public." The
Dodge brothers claimed that the directors of FMC, whose year-end profits for
the 1916 fiscal year were approximately $60 million, had an obligation to
distribute any accumulated profits to the shareholders. 29
Ford disagreed, insisting that the corporation had a responsibility to
benefit the general public and that his decision to withhold dividends was
consistent with this responsibility.'30 In an interview with the Detroit News,
123. See Millon, supra note 12, at 230 ("By 1932, corporate law had already endorsed the
view that shareholder financial interests should guide managerial decision-making without
regard to competing, nonshareholder claims.").
124. Modem statutes require that the corporation be managed by or under the direction of
the board ofdirectors. ERNEST L. FOLKET AL., FOLK ONTHE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 141 (2d ed. 1990); Rev. M.B.CA. § 8.01 (1969). Such statutes further provide that
directors, when carrying out this duty, act in the bests interests of the corporation. See Rev.
M.B.CA. § 8.30 (2000).
125. See Millon, supra note 12, at 228 (equating shareholder interests with profit maximi-
zation).
126. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
127. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (outlining share-
holder privacy doctrine).
128. It is arguable that Ford refused to pay dividends because he believed the Dodge
brothers planned to use the additional money to build a rival car company. Also, Ford, who
owned 85% of the outstanding shares, may have refused to pay dividends to avoid paying taxes.
Because by 1920 the maximum federal income tax rate was 73%, Ford would have owed a
substantial amount of tax payments as a result of the issuance of any special dividends.
129. 170 N.W. at 679. FMC's accumulated profit at the end of the 1916 fiscal year was
almost $174 million. Id. at 670. In 1915, the special dividend was $10 million. This dividend
was substantially more than the regular dividend paid to shareholders. Indeed, in 1915, the
Dodge brothers, who owned 10% of the company, received $1 million as a special dividend,
while receiving only $120,000 as a regular dividend. See id. at 670,683.
130. Id. at684.
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 409 (2002)
Ford stated, "And let me say right here, that I do not believe that we should
make such an awful profit on our cars... [I]t has been my policy to force the
price of the car down as fast as production would permit, and give the bene-
fits to users and laborers." 3' At trial, when questioned about this statement,
Ford went even further, suggesting not only that the corporation's goal was
to consider a wide range of groups, but also that the shareholder's interests
should not be considered primary to others.13 Ford was asked, "What is the
Ford Motor Company organized for except for profits?" Ford responded,
"Organized to do as much good as we can, everywhere, for everybody con-
cemed ...[a]nd incidentally to make money."'133 This exchange reveals
Ford's belief that wealth maximization reflected an incidental goal of the
corporate enterprise that should be subordinated to the concerns of the
public.
The Michigan Supreme Court vehemently disagreed with this view of the
corporation and not only ordered Ford to pay special dividends, but also
issued one of the strongest endorsements of the shareholder-primacy model
to date.13 The court reasoned that Ford's attitude toward the corporation
reflected confusion about the duties a director owed to his shareholders. 35
The court believed the issue was clear: "A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end.' 36 This reasoning reflects "as pure
an example as exists" of the shareholder-primacy conception of the corpora-
tion and confirms the fears of opponents of privatization.
37
However, even during this time period, the Dodge court's view of the
corporation's primary objective did not go unchallenged. The decision
sparked considerable discussion about the proper goal of the corporate enter-
prise. This was epitomized in the classic debate between Harvard Law School
Professor Adolf Berle and Columbia Law School Professor Merrick Dodd."
Berle, agreeing with Dodge, claimed that the principal function of the corpora-
131. ALLEN NEVINS & FRANK E. HILL, FORD: EXPANSION AND CHALENGE, 1915-33, at
97 (1957) (quoting interview).
132. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
133. See NEVINS & HIlL, supra note 131, at99-100 (quoting interview).
134. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685.
135. The Michigan Supreme Court stated, "There should be no confusion (of which there
is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the
general public and the duties which in law he and his co-directors owe to protesting, minority
stockholders." Id. at 684.
136. Id.
137. See Allen, supra note 12, at 268 (discussing Dodge).
138. See, e.g., Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corpo-
ration, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1458, 1458 (1964) (discussing debate).
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tion and its directors was to maximize shareholder profit.' 9 In contrast, Dodd
urged the consideration of the interests of a variety of corporate constitu-
ents, such as employees and creditors, because such groups have a stake in
the corporation's welfare."4 Dodd believed that directors' decisions should
encompass the interests of all those who interacted and were impacted by
the corporation."' This debate, as well as the competing views of the
Dodge court and Henry Ford, captured the schizophrenia noted by Chancellor
Allen.
142
While this debate may have begun as largely theoretical, in recent years,
courts have indicated a preference for a more expansive view of the corpora-
tion by allowing directors to consider other interests, even at the expense of
the shareholder. 43 Courts never formally rejected the shareholder primacy
model, but fashioned a doctrine that seemed to accommodate both corporate
paradigms. Under this doctrine, courts allowed directors to make decisions
that at first blush appeared to be antithetical to the interests of shareholders,
as long as directors could provide a plausible connection between the decision
and the long-term interests of the shareholders. An example of this is the case
of Shlensky v. Wrigley,1" in which a minority stockholder sued the directors
of Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., which owned and operated the
Chicago Cubs baseball team, for refusing to schedule night games and refus-
ing to install lights in Wrigley Field.'4 The shareholders maintained that the
teams' failure to play night games was causing the company to lose money."
139. See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1049 (1931) (stating that "all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a
corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or
both, arc necessary and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all shareholders").
140. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1932). Berle later conceded that "the argument has been settled (at least
for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's contention." ADOIPE A. BERLE, JR.,
THE 20T CEwNuhy CAPrrAIST REVOLUrIoN 169 (1954). Berle agreed that directors of the
modem corporation not only had a profit making role, but also were administrators of a
community of interests. Id.
141. See Dodd, supra note 140, at 1148 (finding it undesirable to emphasize view that
corporations exist for sole benefit of shareholders).
142. See Allen, supra note 12, at 268
143. See Rima Fawal Hartman, Note, Situation - Specific Fiduciay Duties for Corporate
Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761, 1761
(1993) ("Judicial opinions, legislative acts, and scholarly legal articles are replete with evidence
of dissatisfaction with the traditional idea that a corporation is a mere profit-making entity
whose interests are equivalent to the interests of those who hold its stock.").
144. 237 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. Ct. 1968).
145. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776,777 (II. App. Ct. 1968) (stating claim).
146. Id.
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The directors admitted that they were not interested in whether the baseball
team would increase their profits by playing night games.14' Rather, the direc-
tors' decision stemmed from their belief that night games would have a "deter-
iorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood."14 Pointing to the princi-
ples set out in Dodge, the shareholders argued -that this decision was illegiti-
mate because it rested on concerns unrelated to the shareholders' financial
interests.
149
Disagreeing, the Illinois Court of Appeals found that the directors' deci-
sion complied with their duty."5 ° The court rationalized that directors did not
have to pursue the course of action with the most immediate potential for
financial gains.' Instead, directors could make decisions that would further
the corporation's and the shareholder's long-term interests. 2 The deteriora-
tion of the surrounding neighborhood could impact a patron's decision to
attend a baseball game and in the long-term could reduce the profitability of
the corporation and hence the profit of the shareholder. 53 Thus, the directors
could properly consider the impact their policies would have on the neighbor-
hood."5 Based on this reasoning, the directors could forgo short-term profits
to prevent the neighborhood's deterioration, which would have an effect on
the corporation's potential to generate long-term profits.' In Wrigley, we see
the beginning of courts' reliance on the long-term interests of shareholders to
justify board decisions that do not appear to have any short-term value to
shareholders. This reliance seems contrary to Dodge. Certainly, the board in
Dodge could have benefitted from this long-term/short-term dichotomy.
Indeed, it is arguable that a FMC policy of "doing good" by making fewer
expensive cars and employing a large work force in the long-term may in-
crease both employee and customer satisfaction. Moreover, this policy could
generate positive publicity for FMC. Under Wrigley, these long-term effects
may have been enough to enable the FMC board to withhold the short-term
benefit of special dividends. Moreover, these justifications may have been
147. See id. at 778 (discussing defendant's refusal to install lights based on opinion that
baseball should be played during daylight hours).
148. Id. (quoting president and director Philip K. Wrigley).
149. Id. at 779.
150. See id. at 781 (affirming trial court's dismissal of complaint).
151. Id. at780.
152. See id. (stating that court was not satisfied that directors' decision was against
corporation's long term-interests).
153. Id.
154. See id. (pointing out that "it appears to us that the effect on the surrounding neighbor-
hood might well be considered by a director").
155. The court maintained that the corporation's interests in the property value "might
demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating." Id.
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sanctioned even if Ford had been motivated by non-shareholder concerns.
Interestingly, while the court made efforts to tie the directors' decision to the
(albeit long-term) interests of shareholders, there was no evidence that such
a concern actually motivated the directors' decision. The Illinois court's
willingness not only to overlook the real motivation for the directors' conduct,
but to generate a shareholder-related justification for such conduct runs
counter to the holding and spirit of Dodge. Other courts similarly gave
directors wide latitude to address the concerns of other groups as long as they
could muster some plausible relationship between the shareholders' interests
and such concerns. " 6 By invoking the specter of the corporations' long-term
interests, corporate law could approve of decisions that benefitted other
groups without admitting to a rejection of the concept that directors' ultimate
responsibility was to enhance the shareholders' profit.
Courts' ability to toe such a line was reinforced by the tremendous
deference given to directors' actions. Common and statutory law require that
a director perform her duties in good faith with the care of an ordinary prudent
person and in a manner that she reasonably believes to be in the corporation's
best interests.' The duty is primarily procedural in nature, requiring that
directors make decisions based on adequate information and due delibera-
tion.'" Courts' analyses of directors' duties is modified by the business
judgment rule."19 The business judgment rule presumes that directors act in
good faith and dictates that as long as directors do not engage in fraud or self-
dealing and make rational, informed decisions, courts will not second-guess
their actions.." As applied to corporate managers, this rule means that courts
156. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398,405 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(upholding corporate donation because of its long-term benefit to shareholders); Smith Mfg.
Co. v. Barlow, 98 A-2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) (upholding corporate charitable donation because
corporation has social responsibility to public); Hoist v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 299 N.Y.S.
(App. Div. 1937) (affirming directors' decision to pay workman compensation claim of em-
ployee who suffered injury while playing on corporation's soccer team because team benefitted
corporation).
' 157. As set forth in the Revised Model Business Act, the duty of care is articulated as
follows. A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of
a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation. Rev. M.B.CA § 8.30 (2000). Most states have
enacted statutes to this effect. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 121, at 18 n.107 (discussing
Act).
158. Decisions that have held directors liable for a breach of their duty of care involved
a director's inattention to corporate business, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15,
432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981), or a director's failure to consider carefully all of the ramifications
of a potential transaction, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,(Del. 1985).
159. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
160. See e.g., id.; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del. 1971).
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will honor the majority of directors' decisions."" This deference is evidenced
by the fact that, outside of the self-dealing context, there are very few cases
in which courts have imposed liability on directors for a violation of their
fiduciary duties. 62 Moreover, this discretion enables directors to make
decisions that benefit non-shareholders free from the interference of the courts
and shareholders. The elasticity of courts' reasoning in cases like Wrigley,
coupled with the judicial deference for directors' decisions evidenced in their
application of the business judgment rule, means that courts sanction the vast
majority of directors' decisions, even if they subordinated the financial
interests of shareholders to other groups. In fact, as Professor William Simon
recently noted, there is no modem case in which a court has overturned a
manager's decision because that decision placed public interests above
shareholder interests. 3
2. Application to Public Benefit Corporations
The Dodge conception of a corporation may not have been able to
accommodate public benefit companies. Taken literally, the case stands for
the proposition that directors cannot favor the interests of other constituents
over shareholders. Thus, Dodge is consistent with the philosophical objection
that there is a tension between the directors' duties in these firms and their
commitment to a mission aimed at benefitting the public. Dodge seems
particularly troublesome for the for-profit hospital. At least in Dodge, Ford
aimed to reap some money from his policy of making inexpensive cars, while
161. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
162. In 1968, after a national review of the relevant cases, Professor Joseph Bishop found
that "[t]he search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable
in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small
number of needles in a very large haystack." Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J.
1078, 1099 (1968). Bishop only found four such cases and claimed that they carried no real
conviction. Id. at 1100. Recent studies confirm Bishop's assessment. Indeed, nearly fifteen
years later, Stuart Cohn performed a similar study and only found seven cases. Stuart Cohn,
Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions
Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1983); see also Henry
Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 971, 981 (1994) (noting that his findings on Delaware law relating to duty of
care "were as disappointing as that earlier encountered by Bishop"); Thomas C. Lee, Limiting
Corporate Directors'Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors'
Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 239, 240 (1987) (noting that duty of care has been doctrine
"whose bark is worse than its bite"). While certainly some high-profile cases exist, there
continues to be a judicial reluctance to impose liability on directors for the decisions they make.
See Horsey, supra, at 981-83 (noting lack of Delaware cases discussing issue).
163. William H. Simon, What Difference Does it Make When Corporate Managers Have
Public Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697, 1698 (1993).
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directors of such hospitals would be attempting to provide charitable care to
patients who could not afford to pay for it. Dodge suggests that directors of
a for-profit hospital should forgo charitable care altogether because it does not
serve to enhance directly the wealth of shareholders. In this sense, corporate
law appears to mandate the course of action that promises the greatest poten-
tial for profits without regard to other interests or interest groups.
The restrictions that Dodge placed on directors' decision-making abilities
can be illustrated by considering one of the questions raised by Professor
Solomon's analysis of critics' concerns - whether directors of a privately-
managed K-12 school would decide to close a school prior to the end of the
school year to conserve shareholder profits."6 Assume that X Corp. is a
privately-managed education firm that must decide whether or not to close a
school that is losing money because the cost of maintaining the school is
higher than the revenue generated from the school. 65 Assume fiurther that
closing the school during the middle of the year will save X Corp. significant
resources in teachers' salaries and other expenditures relating to maintaining
the school. By contrast, the school closing will have a decidedly negative
impact on several different constituencies. Indeed, students ivill suffer
because they will be forced into new schools with new instructors and a new
regimen. It follows that surrounding schools will also suffer by having to
absorb an influx of new students mid-year.' 66 Then too, teachers and adminis-
164. One might imagine a similar scenario with respect to hospitals. Indeed, without
conversions, several public hospitals may have been forced to close because of a lack of
resources to sustain their operation. While closures may prevent pouring additional money into
the hospitals, they have a negative impact on the patients, doctors and employees of the hospital
as well as the surrounding hospitals that must absorb the patients. See Singer, supra note 18,
at 228 (noting that, for some hospitals, closures may be inevitable, and these hospitals see for-
profit entities as means of ensuring continued health care).
165. The notion that the costs of privatized schools could exceed revenue is not purely
hypothetical. Indeed, schools have fixed per-pupil funding that may fall short of the myriad
administrative and other costs associated with operation of the schools. See EDISON PROSPEC-
TUs, supra note 47, at 14 (noting that their agreements with school officials are risky because
they require Edison to operate school with funding that does not vary with actual costs). On the
other hand, not all directors will have the freedom to shut down a school prior to the end of the
school year because some of the management agreements that govern privately-operated schools
require that these companies agree to operate schools for a fixed period of time and at a fixed
cost. Id. Thus, to the extent actual costs exceed the amounts under this management agreement,
the company may lose money, but will not have the option of closing the school until after the
management agreement expires.
166. Compulsory school attendance laws, passed by every state and the District of
Columbia, require all children between specific ages to attend a school or receive some form
of education. Thus, if a school closes during the middle of the school year, alternative arrange-
ments must be made for the school children. Consequently, one school closure has a significant
impact on other schools in the area that will be required to expend additional resources on new
school children. In the same vein, under the so-called federal anti-dumping legislation enacted
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trators will suffer by losing their jobs, and, given that the layoff will come
during the middle of the school year, these teachers may not have any pros-
pects of securing new jobs. This is to say nothing of course about the harms
such actions will generate for the parents and spouses of those affiliated with
the school.
By analogy to the principles set forth in Dodge, one might argue that
corporate law commands directors to shut down the school so that resources
can be saved and diverted to other projects. In fact, their decision to continue
funding an unprofitable venture may be viewed as similar to Ford's policy in
that this decision would benefit the public at the expense of the shareholders.
For this reason, it would be advisable for the directors to close the school.
Then too, Dodge suggests that the shareholders would prevail in a suit chal-
lenging the failure to close the school. In this way, as Professor Solomon's
questions suggest, traditional corporate law principles may require directors
of public benefit corporations to ignore the concerns of students and patients
in order to maximize profit.
By contrast, modem case law allows directors to pay heed to the con-
cers of non-shareholders, suggesting that for-profit directors will be able to
adapt to the unique responsibilities of managing public benefit corporations.
Under the social entity paradigm, reflected in cases such as Wrigley, directors
can continue operating the school even if the continuation is aimed at protec-
tion of interests beyond those of shareholders. Indeed, given that the Wrigley
court enabled the directors to disregard the option of night games com-
pletely, 67 directors of X Corp. can refuse to close the school entirely as long
as they believe that a closure would have a negative effect on the school
children. Just as the directors appeared unconcerned about the profit potential
of night games, Wrigley further suggests that the directors of X Corp. can
make this decision without regard to the financial benefits that would inure to
the shareholders as a result of such a closing. Indeed, as long as the directors
(or the court) can formulate a rational reason why the decision to close the
school would harm the long-term interests of the corporate enterprise, courts
will honor it. For example, the negative publicity involved with a closing may
impact the ability of X Corp. to negotiate arrangements with other school
districts. Also, the directors may have a long-term strategy for increasing
in 1986,42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, hospitals may not refuse emergency care to patients based on their
inability to pay, this includes refusal by transfer to another hospital. Thus, when a hospital
closes, other hospitals must provide at least emergency healthcare services to those who need
it. Because of this policy, hospital closures have a broad impact on the patients as well as the
surrounding communities that must absorb those patients.
167. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (II. App. Ct. 1968) (affirming trial
court's decision to dismiss case on grounds that the decision to forgo night games was not im-
proper).
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revenues related to the school that necessitates waiting a few years before the
strategy comes to fruition.'6 The wide discretion afforded to directors under
the business judgment rule further protects directors of these public benefit
companies.169 Under that rule, if a court finds that the directors' decision to
keep a school open is rational, then a court most likely will honor the decision.
Thus, corporate law enables directors to respond safely to the dilemma posed
by Solomon's question by opting against school closure. This fact highlights
the decentralization of the shareholder primacy norm.
Elaborating on the school closure issue further reveals the dominance of
the social entity model. Thus, assume that directors of X Corp. believe that
there is only a slim possibility of generating profits, even in the long term.
Also, assume that there are three available alternatives among which the
directors of X Corp. must choose. The first is to close the school immediately
prior to the completion of the school year. This option will be the most cost
effective for the shareholders, but, as explained previously, would have the
most devastating effect on the school children and the surrounding population.
The second option is to wait until the end of the school year to close the
school, thereby enabling the students to complete the school year and allowing
school employees additional time to find alternative arrangements for employ-
ment the following school year. Although this option will require X Corp to
spend additional resources maintaining the school, given that it is, only half a
school year, the additional expense may not be materially significant. This
may be particularly true in light of the fact that the publicity associated with
a mid-year school closure could impact negatively the company's stock price
and ability to enter into other school contracts. The third alternative is to keep
the school open indefinitely in an effort to make the school more cost effec-
tive. Obviously, this third alternative will involve spending significantly more
resources than the first or second one. In addition, while X Corp. may receive
some reputational benefit from the third option, it may not be enough to offset
the tremendous loss of profits this third option would entail.
The shareholder primacy model may dictate that the directors choose the
first alternative. By contrast, under Wrigley, the second option appears to be
appropriate because there is clearly a rational long-term benefit to sharehold-
ers - the avoidance of negative publicity and its monetary side-effects. The
third option appears more problematic. Indeed, while shareholders have an
interest in avoiding negative publicity, this goal can be furthered by the
second option. Consequently, the tremendous cost of indefinite continued
168. This could entail increasing the enrollment or reducing the administrative costs by
creating a more centralized process. In fact, Edison believes that over time it will be able to
exploit the advantages of scale in a manner that will reduce its administrative overhead signifi-
candy.
169. See supra note 156 (citing cases in which directors were given wide discretion).
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operation of the school suggests that there is no real benefit to shareholders
under the third plan.
However, the shareholder's victory is not completely certain. Indeed,
directors of X Corp. continue to receive the benefit of the business judgment
rule, pursuant to which courts have not been willing to reject directors' plans
even when they appear excessive. In fact, even in Dodge, at the so-called zen-
ith of courts' acceptance of the shareholder-primacy paradigm, the Michigan
Supreme Court refused to halt Ford's plan to create additional manufacturing
plants. 7° In addition to refusing to pay dividends, Ford also had planned to
construct manufacturing plants that would absorb a considerable portion of the
company's resources.' 7 ' The shareholders objected to this expansion policy,
asserting that their existing plants were suitable for their current manufacturing
needs and that Ford's sole reason for creating new plants was to make cheaper
cars and employ more labor.'72 Ford even acknowledged that his plan was to
"employ still more men; to spread benefits.., to the greatest possible number,
to help them build up their lives and their homes."'73 The shareholders viewed
this plan as "reckless in the extreme"'74 because it would entail spending a
considerable amount of the company's resources without any real benefit to the
shareholders.
Although the court acknowledged that the plan called for additional
spending with apparently little possibility of return for shareholders, the court
was not willing to halt the plan. 7' Indeed, the court expressed its reluctance
to question decisions because "judges are not business experts."' 76 This
deference, even in the midst of the court's allegiance to the shareholder
primacy model, suggests that courts may sanction X Corp.'s decision to
pursue the third option. Keep in mind, the Dodge court had ample evidence
of Ford's desire to enhance the welfare of the general public without regard
to profit. 77 That court's willingness to overlook this evidence not only
contradicts the popular belief that the Dodge court completely rejected the
social entity model, but also reveals a tolerance for judicial deference of
company programs. Indeed, Professor Simon points to the fact that the Dodge
court did not enjoin Ford's expansion plan as evidence that the court (and all
modem courts) sanction director policies, even when they place the interests
170. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
171. See id. at 672-74 (discussing reasons for Ford's failure to pay dividends).
172. Id. at 683.
173. Id. at 671 (quoting statements made in Detroit press).
174. Id. at 673 (quoting bill filed by plaintiffs).
175. Id. at 684.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 683-84 (quoting Ford's statement that he wanted to spread benefits of
industrial system).
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of the public above-those of the shareholder.' In this way, courts have given
directors ample room to pursue their business objectives despite the fact that
they may have only an incidental benefit to shareholders, such as the X
Corp.'s third option. This judicial deference reveals the elasticity of corporate
law and undermines the notion that the duties of directors prevent them from
pursuing anything other than wealth maximization for shareholders.
B. Decisions in the Context of a Takeover
1. Status of the Law: Revlon and its Progeny
In the 1980s, the amount of corporate takeover activity increased dramat-
ically," and courts had to determine if board action taken in the context of
this activity was consistent with directors' fiduciary duty. The courts' treat-
ment of shareholders' interests in the takeover context is critical to an under-
standing of the goals of corporate law because decisions made in this context
reflect a clear choice between maximizing shareholder wealth and protecting
other corporate constituents. First, during this period, the short-term/long-
term dichotomy no longer proves useful because once the shareholders tender
their shares in a takeover transaction, they no longer will be a part of the
ongoing corporate enterprise. Thus, the shareholders will have no stake in the
future of the enterprise and no long-term interests, financial or otherwise, in
the concerns of other corporate constituents. Consequently, the board cannot
rely on the long-term interests of shareholders to justify decisions to forgo the
short-term value of takeovers. Second, takeovers impact shareholders and
other groups differently. On the one hand, takeovers often enable sharehold-
ers to reap substantial financial benefits. As a result of one of the largest
takeover transactions, shareholders received $109 per share for their stock
while their shares were trading at $53 a share.8 As this suggests, takeovers
represent one of the best opportunities for directors to maximize the wealth
of their shareholders. On the other hand, takeovers may trigger layoffs and
other forms of dislocation for other members of the corporation.' Because
178. See Simon, supra note 163, at 1698 n.4 (noting that Dodge court only ordered
payment of retained earnings and did not enjoin Ford's plan).
179. During the 1980s, 30% of Fortune 500 companies were targets of hostile takeovers.
See John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain ofMediating Heirarchy: How Contestable Are
U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 851 (1999) (noting increase in takeover bids).
180. This reflects the much-publicized takeover contest for RJR-Nabisco, Inc. which
culminated in a leveraged buyout of the company in 1988 for $24.8 billion. See, e.g., BRYAN
BURROUGH & JOHN HEYLAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: TE FAIL OF RJR NABISCO 503-515
(1990) (discussing buyout).
181. See, e.g., Robert A. Ragazzo, Unif5'ng the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 1022 (1993) (noting that'corporate takeovers pose
substantial threat to non-shareholder constituents).
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the financial gain made by shareholders may come at the expense of these
other groups, their concerns during takeovers are in conflict with these other
groups. Therefore, any willingness by courts to subordinate shareholders'
interests in this context signals significant abandonment of the shareholder
primacy paradigm."8 2 While some Delaware case law in the takeover arena
adheres to the shareholder primacy concept, other cases revealed the courts'
preference for the social entity model."83 A preference in this context signals
a true shift in the courts' understanding of the corporation's proper goal.
Court analysis of takeover activity centers on four critical scenarios.
First, when board members take actions designed to defend against a takeover
attempt."8 4 Second, when a board agrees to put its company up for sale.'
Third, when a board effects a business reorganization." 6 Fourth, when a
board enters into a change of control transaction." 7 Analyzing these decisions
has forced courts to clarify the kinds of interests directors could consider
when carrying out their fiduciary duties.
a. Defensive Actions
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,"8 the Delaware Supreme Court
indicated that it would scrutinize more carefully board actions designed to
thwart certain takeover attempts.8 9 The Delaware court noted that manage-
ment interests often were at odds with shareholder interests because, like
employees, managers have a desire to maintain the status quo."s Given the
182. As one scholar notes, "[iJudicial and legislative willingness to place restrictions on
the market for corporate control represents an important prelude to the frontal assault on
shareholder primacy." Millon, supra note 12, at 240.
183. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(noting that, even within the takeover context, board is generally under no duty to maximize
shareholder profit).
184. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 941, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting
"enhanced duty" when board members address and defend against pending takeover bid).
185. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (noting that, in the takeover context, upon board's recognition that corporation is up for
sale, board's duty changes from protecting corporate bastion to maximizing shareholder value).
186. See Time, 493 A.2d at 1151-55 (applying enhanced duties to corporation's strategic
plan involving business reorganization).
187. See Paramount Communications, Inc., v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43, 45
(Del. 1993) (noting that sale or change of control transaction implicates enhanced judicial
scrutiny).
188. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
189. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting
directors' "enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination" in cases involving takeover
attempts).
190. See id.
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misalignment between directors' and shareholders' interests, the Delaware
court could not grant directors the deferential treatment previously afforded
to their decisions."" Thus, the court announced that when board members
attempted to thwart a hostile takeover attempt, thereby denying shareholders
the ability to receive large returns, these members would have to justify their
decision in a more exacting fashion."
However, although the court displaced its customary deference to board
decisions, it indicated that the social entity concept should continue to dictate
directors' conduct. The court stated that boards legitimately could consider
a host of other constituencies when defending against takeover attempts. 94
The court specifically noted that one of the concerns that directors legiti-
mately could consider was "the impact on constituencies other than sharehold-
ers (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally).'095 This decision marks one of the first times the Delaware court
explicitly condoned the social entity model. Moreover, it reveals that as long
as a board is not willing to sell its company, it can institute defenses measures
aimed at protecting groups other than shareholders.
b. Placing the Company Up for Sale
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,"9 the Delaware
Supreme Court concluded that when the board agrees to put a company up for
sale, the directors' duty changes to one aimed at protecting the shareholders'
financial interests.'" In Revlon, in response to a threatened tender offer by
Pantry Pride, Inc. (Pantry Pride), the board of Revlon, Inc. (Revlon) adopted
several measures designed to prohibit Pantry Pride's acquisition of Revlon,
including a program whereby the company repurchased 10 million of its
shares in exchange for notes."g The notes contained certain covenants that
191. See id. at 958 (noting that protection conferred under business judgment rule is not
absolute).'
192. The Delaware Supreme Court announced a two-step inquiry related to directorial
measures designed to defend against a takeover. Id. at 955. First, directors must show that they
have reasonable grounds to believe that a takeover posed a danger to corporate policy. Id.
Second, directors must prove that the defensive maneuver adopted was reasonable in proportion
to such threat. Id. at 955-56.
193. See id. (maintaining that concern for welfare of stockholders does not end takeover
analysis).
194. See id. at 955 (discussing directors' analysis of takeover bids).
195. Id.
196. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
197. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986) (reasserting shareholder primacy doctrine in context of agreements to sell).
198. The company also instituted a shareholders' rights plan that effectively would prohibit
acquisition of the company unless the board agreed to redeem the rights. Id. at 177. Under the
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effectively prevented takeover of the company.' " When Pantry Pride finally
announced a cash tender offer of $47.50 per share, conditioned upon elimina-
tion of the defensive measures, the board rejected it as inadequate.2" Pantry
Pride then increased its offer to $56.25 with the same conditions.2"' The
Revlon board again rejected the offer.2" Instead, the board entered into an
agreement with Forstmann Little & Co. (Forstmann) pursuant to which
Forstmann would purchase Revlon stock at $57.25 a share in a leveraged
buyout.' 3 As a result of the buyout, Forstmann would sell certain divisions
of Revlon. The Revlon board also granted Forstmann a "lock-up" option to
purchase certain divisions of Revlon at $100-s175 million below their value
even if Fortsmann was not the ultimate purchaser of the Revlon shares.2"4 In
return, Fortsmann consented to pay full value for the outstanding notes, which
had declined in value since their issuance. 5 When Pantry Pride again raised
its offer, only to have Revlon rebuff them, it filed an action to enjoin the
consummation of the Forstmann deal.2"s
The Delaware court first confirmed that Unocal governs board actions
aimed solely at repelling a hostile takeover attempt.2" Thus, the Revlon
board's adoption of the repurchase plan to protect shareholders from Pantry
Pride's inadequate offer was legitimate.2° Moreover, if the board had be-
lieved that Pantry Pride's offer threatened non-shareholder interests, the
board's fiduciary duty would have enabled it to take defensive actions de-
signed to protect those interests.2'
plan, each Revlon shareholder would receive one Right for each share of common stock, which
could be exchanged for a $65 principal Revlon note at 12% interest. Id. The Rights, which
could be redeemed by the board for 10 cents each, would become effective whenever anyone
acquired beneficial ownership of 20% or more of Revlon shares unless the purchaser acquired
all of the company's stock for $65 a share. Id. This kind of plan is known as a "poison pill."
Id. at 180.
199. The notes limited Revlon's ability to incur additional debt, sell assets, or pay divi-
dends without board approval. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
200. Id. at 181.
201. Id. at 184.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The Fortsmann agreement also included a S25 million cancellation fee and a "no-
shop" provision which prevented Revlon from soliciting or discussing any competing transac-
tions with other parties. Id. at 175-79.
205. Id. at 178.
206. . Id. at 179.
207. Id. at 176
208. Id.
209. See id. at 1 81 (stating that board's response to Pantry Pride's offer was within board's
duties and responsibilities).
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However, once the board made the decision to sell the company and
break it up, its duty "changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockhold-
ers' benefit."210 In the courts' view, the board's action of engaging Fortsmann
reflected the board's acceptance of the sale and break-up of the company.
211
Indeed, not only did Fortsmann plan to sell divisions of the company if it
consummated a takeover, but the board agreed to sell Fortsmann certain
divisions of Revlon even if a Fortsmann takeover was not consummated.
212
This acceptance of a corporate sale and break-up meant that the board's
primary concern should have shifted toward obtaining the best financial value
for its shareholders. 2 3 Because the Revlon board continued to institute
defensive measures even after Pantry Pride raised its offer price to a more
acceptable level, the board violated their fiduciary duty.
214
In addition, the Revlon court found it unacceptable for the board to con-
sider the interests ofother corporate constituents when carrying out this duty.215
The Revlon board maintained that it had not breached its duty because the
decision to accept the Forstman deal reflected a consideration of other corpo-
rate constituents, principally the noteholders. 21 6 The board argued that because
Forstnann agreed to support the full value of the notes, his offer was more
beneficial to the noteholders.2 17 Because the Forstmann deal provided protec-
tion to other corporate constituents, the board believed that Unocal enabled it
to legitimately accept that deal even if it provided less value to the sharehold-
ers.218 The court disagreed, stating that once the board agreed to sell the com-
pany and effect its break up, decisions made in favor of other groups were
inappropriate. 219 Instead, the board only could consider other group interests
if they were "rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders. ' "22 These
interests, however, clearly could not take precedent over the board's duty to
increase the shareholders wealth." Because the board allowed considerations
210. Id. at 182.




214. See id. (noting impropriety of board's continued use of defensive measures).
215. Id. at 185.
216. See id. at 182 (noting that directors' argument that Unocal permitted consideration
of other corporate constituencies' interests)..
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. (stating that concern for non-shareholder interests was improper).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 184.
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other than the maximization of shareholder profit to impact their judgment, the
court concluded that the directors had breached their duty.
222
c. Change-of-Control Transactions
Consistent with Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court also held that
directors had an obligation to maximize shareholder value in the context of a
change-of-control transaction. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc.,' Viacom, Inc. (Viacom) sought to acquire Paramount Com-
munications, Inc. (Paramount) through a tender offer of 51% of Paramount
stock followed by a stock for stock merger.224 The transaction would result
in Viacom owning a majority of the stock of Paramount.2' The Paramount/
Viacom agreement contained several defensive measures designed to forestall
any competing takeover attempts." 6 When QVC Network, Inc. (QVC)
launched a competing tender offer for Paramount stock at a higher price, but
subject to the removal of the defensive measures, the board rejected it.227
The Delaware Supreme Court found that the board's rejection violated
its fiduciary duty.m The Paramount board claimed that an alliance with
Viacom would prove better for the corporation in the long-term and, therefore,
took measures that favored such an alliance.2' However, the court stated that
the board's focus was inappropriate.' In the court's view, once a change of
control occurs, the current stockholders no longer would have the leverage to
demand premium value for their shares."' As such, directors have an "obliga-
tion to take the maximum advantage of the current opportunity to realize for
the stockholders the best value reasonably available. 1112 To protect its original
agreement with Viacom, the Paramount board not only refused to remove
defensive measures, but also made no significant quantitative assessment of
222. Id.
223. 637 A-2d 34 (Del. 1993).
224. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 40 (Del.
1993) (outlining Viacom's propoaed acquisition of Paramount).
225. See id. (noting that Viacom's offer was for 51% of Paramount's stock).
226. The measures included a no-shop clause, a $100 million termination fee and a stock
option agreement that was very beneficial to Viacom. Id. at 39.
227. Id. at41.
228. Id. at 49.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 43 (reasoning that once control shifts, current shareholders cannot demand
control premium). Thus, the Delaware court stringently asserted the dominance of the share-
holder-primacy model, stating that the directors must focus on "one primary objective - to secure
the transaction offering the beat value reasonably available for the stockholders." Id. at 44.
232. Id. at 43.
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the consideration QVC offered.2 3 Because of this, the court indicated that the
board missed opportunities to secure a more favorable transaction for its
shareholders, consequently breaching its fiduciary duty." 4 In this way, the
Delaware Supreme Court indicated that directors could not maintain a long-
term strategy at odds with shareholders' goal of increasing their short-term
value during a change of control.235
The Paramount court also suggested that consideration of other groups'
interests could not impact board decisions in this area.236 While the court
acknowledged that a board might be able to consider other interests in the
context of a change of control, all of the interests enumerated by the court
were financial in nature.231 Noticeably, the court, in quoting an earlier
decision concerning the interests that a board legitimately could consider, did
not include the portion of the decision that specifically referenced the direc-
tors' ability to consider the interests of other constituents." By dropping this
language, the court apparently confirmed the dominance of the shareholder
primacy model in the context of change-of-control transactions. This confir-
mation, by its terms, rejects the social entity paradigm.
d. Corporate Reorganizations
In contrast with Paramount, the Delaware Supreme Court held in an
earlier case, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,239that inbusiness
reorganizations not involving a change of control or break-up of the company,
directors need only comport with Unocal and, therefore, may consider inter-
233. See id. at 49 (holding that board's agreement to defensive measures and disparate
treatment of bidders was unreasonable). The board claimed that the Paramount transaction
would be more advantageous than an alliance with QVC, but failed to produce substantial evi-
dence in support of this claim. See id. at 41 (detailing board's basis for believing that Para-
mount transaction was more advantageous).
234. See id. at 49-50 (detailing missed opportunities with QVC).
235. The court stated that the Paramount board's view of the value of the strategic alliance
"became an empty rationalization as the opportunities for higher value for the stockholders con-
tinued to develop." Id. at 51.
236. See id. at 43-45 (discussing directors' obligations in sale or change of control trans-
actions).
237. See id. at 44 (holding that board should consider "[an offer's] fairness and feasibility,
the proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions
of illegality,.., the risk of nonconsum[m]ation; . . the bidder's identity, prior background and
other business venture experiences; and the bidder's business plan for the corporation and their
effects on stockholder interests") (alterations in original) (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc, 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989)).
238. The dropped language states: "the potential acquisition on other constituents, pro-
vided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests." Mills Acquis-
itaon Co., 559 A.2d at 1282 n.29.
239. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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ests beyond those of shareholders.24° After several years of planning and as
part of its strategic plan to expand operations, the board of Time, Inc. (Time)
entered into a stock for stock merger agreement with Warner Communica-
tions, Inc. (Warner).24 As a result of the agreement, a new entity, Time-
Warner, would exist, with Warner shareholders owning approximately 62%
of the new entity.242 Throughout the merger negotiations with Warner, the
directors of Time emphasized their desire to preserve the journalistic integrity
of Time - the "Time Culture."24' 3 In fact, the board continually insisted that
they would agree to a merger with Warner only if the directors of Time
controlled the board of the resulting corporation, thereby insuring the preser-
vation of the Time culture.2' This issue was so important to the Time board
that when Warner refused to guarantee Time's dominance on the surviving
board, negotiations between the two entities ended.
245
Eventually negotiations resumed, with Warner agreeing to retain Time's
senior management after the merger.2' After coming to suitable terms on the
remainder of the deal, both companies scheduled shareholder meetings to vote
on the proposed transaction. 247  Time adopted several defensive measures,
including a no-shop clause, designed to thwart any takeover attempts.
248
240. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989)
(holding that "possibility of inadequate value" is not only cognizable corporate threat in tender
offer situation).
241. See id. at 1143-47 (detailing negotiations and final agreement to merge). The merger
was to be a stock exchange by which Warner would be merged into a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Time, with Warner becoming the surviving corporation. The common stock of Warner
would then be converted into Time common stock at an agreed-upon ratio. Afterward, the
surviving company would be named Time-Warner, Inc. Id. at 1146; Lyman Johnson & David
Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105,2105 n.2 (1990).
242. Time, 571 A.2d at 1146.
243. See id. at 1143 n.4 (noting Time management's concern that merger would divert
Time's focus from news journalism to entertainment). Chancellor Allen referred to this culture
as both "pride in the history of the firm - notably Time magazine and its role in American life -
and in part a managerial philosophy and distinctive structure that is intended to protect journal-
istic integrity from pressures from the business side of the enterprise." Johnson & Millon, supra
note 241, at 2105-06 (citations omitted).
244. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1144 (stating that Time's board felt merger was feasible only
if Time controlled board of resulting corporation).
245. See id. at 1145 (noting that negotiations ended "when the parties reached an impasse"
on this issue).
246. See id. at 1145-46 (detailing resumption of negotiations after Time and Warner agreed
that Warner's co-CEO ultimately would step down).
247. Although Delaware law did not require a vote by the Time stockholders, Time was
required to obtain a vote by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 1146.
248. Id. at 1146-47. In addition to the no-shop clause, which prevented Time from con-
sidering other consolidations, Time secured promises from banks that they would not finance
a third-party attempt to acquire Time. Id.
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Despite these efforts, and shortly before the shareholder meetings, Paramount
launched a competing tender offer.249 Time rejected the offer, primarily based
on the board's belief that an alliance with Warner would ensure the retention
of the Time culture.Y° However, the Time board feared that the Paramount
offer would cause its shareholders to reject the proposed Warner merger.25
Thus, Time recast the merger as a tender offer that did not require shareholder
approval. The shareholders of Time and Paramount sued to enjoin the con-
summation of the tender offer.252 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
Time board's actions.253
The court began by concluding that the board's actions did not constitute
a change of control implicating Revlon because the board's actions did not
make the dissolution or break-up of the company inevitable.' Rather, the
transaction amounted to a corporate reorganization. As long as the board's
conduct did not reflect "an abandonment of the corporation's continued
existence, Revlon duties are not triggered, though Unocal duties attach."255
Thus, the board had no duty to maximize shareholder wealth, but could
consider the various interests proscribed under Unocal. The court explained
that financial interests were not the only legally cognizable interests that board
members could consider in connection with a tender offer." 6 Instead, board
members could consider important corporate policies, such as retention of the
Time culture.
Moreover, Time revealed that board members could subordinate share-
holder concerns to protect other interests. In fact, the court allowed the Time
board to decline a seemingly higher offer to protect corporate policy. More
249. See id. at 1147-49 (detailing Paramount's initial all-cash purchase price of $175 per
share and its eventual increase to $200 per share). After the initial announcement of the offer,
Time stock rose from $126 to $170 per share. Id. at 1147. •
250. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1149 (stating that Time's directors believed that Paramount
deal "pose[d] a threat to Time's survival and its culture"). The Time board also professed a
belief that, in the long-term, the value of the Time-Warner transaction would be greater than the
Paramount tender offer. Id. The court, however, focused on the extent to which'the preserva-
tion of Time culture was a legitimate concern for Time in the context of a takeover. See id. at
1153 (holding that Time could evaluate Paramount's all-cash offer on bases in addition to
adequacy of value).
251. See id. at 1149 (noting Chancellor Allen's finding that restructured transaction
"resulted from Paramount's offer and its expected effect on a Time shareholder vote").
252. ld. at 1141-42.
253. Id. at 1155.
254. See id. at 1150 (rejecting Revlon claim because Time's board negotiation did not
make dissolution or break-up "inevitable").
255. Id. at 1150-51.
256. See id. at 1153 (holding that Unocal does not stipulate "narrow and rigid construc-
tion").
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importantly, in allowing the Time board to recast their merger transaction as
a tender offer, the court enabled the board to prevent its shareholders even
from casting a vote related to the Time-Warner transaction. Thus, Time
illustrates that when planning a reorganization, board members can favor the
interests of non-shareholders or corporate policies, even when such actions
deprive shareholders of short-term profits and other important rights, such as
the voting right.
2. Application to Public Benefit Companies
Delaware case law in the takeover context presents a murky picture for
all for-profit corporations, including those with public beneficiaries. How-
ever, not all companies will be subject to the market for corporate control, and
public benefit companies may not be likely candidates for takeover activity.
If this is true, the often-confusing case law in this area need not concern us.
Of course, because takeover case law encompasses corporate decisions related
to changes of control and business reorganizations, it is important to under-
stand the applicability of these cases to public benefit companies.
a. Defensive Actions and Corporate Reorganizations
As long as a public benefit company seeks only to defend against a
takeover attempt, Delaware courts prefer the social entity model indicated by
Unocal. Therefore, boards of post-conversion companies may consider the
interest of the other groups they serve, even when confronted with a takeover
attempt. For example, board members of a hospital could defend against a
hostile takeover based on the potential acquirer's practice of sharply reducing
charity care after acquisition. Additionally, Time makes it clear that public
benefit corporations may engage in corporate reorganizations that consider
interests of their public bendficiaries. Certainly, if the board in Time could
consider the impact of a transaction on its culture, directors of a public benefit
corporation can consider the impact a reorganization transaction would have
on students and patients. Moreover, in the context of reorganizations, board
members can deny shareholders the chance to participate in takeovers alto-
gether. In fact, the Delaware courts "have repeatedly stated that the refusal to
entertain an offer may comport with a valid exercise of a board's business
judgment."25' By allowing directors to prevent shareholders from taking
advantage of typically lucrative tender offers, cases such as Paramount more
plainly indicate the court's willingness to de-center shareholders' financial
interests for other values.258
257. Time, 571 A.2d at 1152.
258. See Millon, supra note 12, at 225 (reasoning that cases like Paramount indicate will-
ingness to subordinate shareholders' financial interests to "other values").
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b. Placing the Company Up for Sale and Change-of-Control Transactions
Under Revlon, once a company is deemed to be up for sale, directors'
duties shift away from considering the interests of all corporate constituents.
This poses a source of tension for directors of public benefit companies.
Similarly, Paramount reveals that when a company engages in a change of
control transaction, it must consider primarily the interests of shareholders.
The Revlon duty of wealth maximization, reiterated by Paramount, epitomizes
the tension emphasized by opponents of for-profit conversions. Thus, one
author noted:
It would be entirely in accordance with their duty of care and business
judgment responsibilities, for example, for the directors of a nonprofit
hospital to accept a low bid from one of several suitors because the chosen
bidder would provide a far higher level of public benefit or service to the
community. In most circumstances, a for-profit board would not have -
and should not have - such freedom. 9
This expression of the difference between the duties of directors appears
consistent with Revlon. For example, while Unocal enables directors to
consider other groups when they are not willing to sell the corporation, once
the board members of a public benefit corporation make the decision to sell,
corporate law may require the members to consummate the sale in a manner
that compromises the company's charitable mission. Revlon implies that
directors can consider other interests only if they are rationally related to those
of the shareholders. However, as applied to the aforementioned example of
the low bid, this formulation of a director's duty could not be used to support
the acceptance of a low bid by directors of a public benefit company because
directors would find it difficult to fashion a scenario whereby acceptance of
that bid would be consistent with the interests of shareholders. More impor-
tantly, Paramount suggests that while the board may make inquiries into the
financial soundness of the bid, they may not reject the bid in order to protect
the kind of non-financial concerns that are endemic to public benefit corpora-
tions." Terefore, to the extent that Revlon applies to these corporations,261
259. Goldschmid, supra note 9, at 641.
260. See supra notes 223-38 and accompanying text (discussing Paramount case).
261. Some suggest that Revlon should apply to the boards of nonprofit corporations when
they enter into conversion transactions. See generally Colin T. Moran, Why Revlon Applies to
Nonprofit Corporations, 53 BUS. LAW. 373, 387-88 (1998) (arguing that Revlon should apply
to nonprofit corporations' conversions for doctrinal and public policy reasons). In making this
declaration, Moran rejected an argument for modifying Revlon to enable directors of nonprofits
to reject bids if they believe the bidder will not conduct itself in a manner consistent with the
nonprofit's mission. Id. Moran believed that while applying Revlon to nonprofits might be
problematic, it would be even more difficult for a court to determine whether or not the bidder's
conduct was consistent with a nonprofit's mission. Id.
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the doctrine creates a seemingly insurmountable tension between the duties
of directors in public benefit companies and the pursuit of the more altruistic
goals of the entities.
On further analysis, Delaware decisions may severely limit Revlon's
impact. First, the impact of Paramount on change-of-control transactions is
less certain when read in conjunction with Time. Indeed, Paramount and
Time have many similarities. Both cases involved plans in which a new entity
or group would hold more than 50% of the shares of the targeted company.
Also, in both cases, board members first entered into a transaction with one
company that they claimed was more compatible with the corporation's long-
term agenda. Then, too, the corporate boards defended against hostile take-
overs on the basis of their previous agreements. Given these similarities, one
would have expected Paramount, which was decided after Time, either to
comply with the principles in Time or to reject them. Instead, the Paramount
court sidestepped the issue. The court claimed that the two cases were distin-
guishable because while Paramount involved a change of control, Time did
not. In the Paramount court's view, the initial merger agreement between
Time and Warner did not result in a change in control because the stock of
both corporations was publicly held and, hence, control would remain "in a
large, fluid and changeable market."262 In contrast, the transaction in Para-
mount amounted to a change of control because although a majority of Para-
mount stock was publicly held, the stock of both Viacom and QVC was
privately held; hence, under the court's analysis, their combination with
Paramount would reflect a change of control.263 Indeed, the Paramount court
noted that if Warner had been a privately-held company, its merger with Time
would have constituted a change of control.2" If this distinction is to be taken
seriously, public benefit corporations can engage in mergers in which a
change of control takes place, as long as they involve two public companies.
This limits the Revlon duty to change of control interactions involving private
companies.
Second, these cases continue to leave open the possibility that companies
can engage in transactions falling short of a dissolution or break-up without
triggering Revlon. Indeed, the distinction between change of control transac-
tions articulated by the Paramount court seems tenuous at best. The Time
court held that the Time-Warner transaction did not constitute a change of
control because the transaction did not involve a dissolution or break-up of the
262. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,47 (Del. 1993).
263. See id. at 37-38 (analyzing control of Paramount, Viacom, and QVC stock); id. at 42-
43 (holding that sale of majority of shares to single, cohesive group results in "significant
diminution" of current shareholders' rights and, thus, gives acquirer power "to alter [the] vision"
of company).
264. Id. at 46.
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corporate enterprise.26 Moreover, in distinguishing Time and Revlon, the
Time court noted that this feature clearly triggers a shift in a director's duty.266
However, while purporting to follow Time, the Paramount court rejected the
argument that both a break-up and a change in majority stock ownership is
required to trigger the Revlon duty.2  Moreover, the Time -court refused to
rely on the characterization of a change-of-control transaction accepted by
Paramount." While these cases appear to conflict with one another,269 the
Paramount court professed a desire to limit that case to its facts. The court
stated, 'We express no opinion on any scenario except the actual facts before
the Court, and our precise holding herein. '' o By limiting Paramount to its
facts, the court leaves open the possibility that other transactions, specifically
those not involving a corporate break-up, may not trigger the Revlon duty to
subordinate non-shareholder concerns. Arguably, one critical distinction
between Paramount and Time is that while the Time board professed a con-
cern for non-shareholder interests during the course of the entire transaction,
the Paramount board appeared primarily concerned with financial interests.
Based on this distinction, board members of public benefit corporations who
structure a sale of the corporate enterprise or other restructuring transactions
with due regard for their charitable or other missions and remain committed
to the mission throughout the course of the sale may not be deemed to have
violated their duty. Any restructuring transactions involving public benefit
corporations are likely to be closer to the facts and spirit of Time than Para-
mount, thereby enabling these boards to avoid triggering Revlon when engag-
ing in a "change of control." Also, in the aforementioned example, directors
of the public benefit company may be able to choose the lower bid as long as
they express a desire to provide a high level of public service throughout the
bidding process. Indeed, a board's desire to continue the provision of charita-
ble care or particular education services seems more compelling than the
desire to protect a company's journalistic integrity sanctioned by Time. Thus,
courts may be more willing to endorse this conduct, even when it is closer to
the Revlon trigger.
265. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
266. See id. (holding that Revlon duties are invoked where there is "clear break-up" or
abandonment of long-term strategies coupled with pursuit of alternative involving break-up).
267. Paramount, 637 A-2d at 47-48.
268. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (noting that while lower court held that there was no
change of control because control would pass to fluid group of public shareholders, Delaware
Supreme Court would adopt different rationale).
269. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 241, at 2112 (noting difficulty of harmonizing
Time and Paramount).
270. Paramount, 637 A2d at 43 n.1 3.
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Moreover, given the narrowing dicta in Time and Paramount, it may be
reasonable to believe that Delaware courts will allow greater latitude to public
benefit companies. Indeed, these cases reveal the Delaware courts' insistence
on "read[ing] Revlon's flash point narrowly. 271 Even while seeming to adopt
the shareholder primacy model, the Paramount court suggested that only
rarely would it adhere to such a model. 2 Thus, the Paramount court began
its analysis by stating that under normal circumstances, "neither the courts nor
the stockholders should interfere with the managerial decisions of the direc-
tors. The business judgment rule embodies the deference to which such
decisions are entitled." '273 This assertion reveals the eclipsing nature of the
social entity model. Indeed, given that in ordinary business decisions the
court has followed the social entity model explicitly sanctioned in Unocal, the
court appears to concede its general prominence. Moreover, by referring to
its prior framework as the norm, the Paramount court suggests that its insis-
tence on shareholder primacy under Revlon represents a deviation from that
norm."' The Time court also emphasized that the principles articulated in
Revlon only applied to a limited set of circumstances.275 Outside of these
narrow instances, the Time court insisted that a board "is not under any per se
duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of
a takeover.""7 " This language reveals the court's desire to restrict the Revlon
duty of shareholder maximization, while allowing directors wide latitude to
consider the concerns of all groups. This means that directors of public
benefit corporations normally will not run afoul of their fiduciary responsibili-
ties if they consider the concerns of students, patients, and other groups when
making decisions. In this way, public benefit corporations fit quite snugly in
the niche carved out by Time, indicating that Revlon may have no appreciable
impact on these directors.
Taken as a whole, this discussion indicates that Delaware law has strayed
from its shareholder-focused roots. Because of this, in almost all situations,
directors of public benefit corporations have significant flexibility to make
271. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 241, at 2110-11 (noting that even though Chancery
court read Revlon narrowly, Delaware Supreme Court read it even more narrowly).
272. See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 41-42 (stating that although directors are representative
of stockholders, normally directors' decisions command deference).
273. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
274. See id. (citing Revlon as exemplary of "rare situations" mandating judicial review of
reasonableness of directors' decisions).
275. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)
(holding that only two general circumstances trigger Revlon duties). Indeed, the Time decision
"blunt[ed the] force [of Revlon] by treating it as a special case." Johnson & Millon, supra note
237, at 2112. The authors note that while the court "pays its respect to the Revlon reasoning"
it refuses to extend it and insisted on reading it narrowly. Id. at 2110.
276. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
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decisions that maximize the interests of other groups regardless of the context.
Clearly Wrigley, Unocal, and even Paramount confirm the notion that the
duty to maximize shareholder value without regard to other interests applies
only in limited takeover settings. Because it is unclear if these companies will
be subject to takeover attempts, these settings may not even arise. More
specifically, even within the context of takeovers, the board can institute
defensive measures and engage in significant restructuring without regard to
Revlon. Revlon is implicated if directors agree to the break-up of the corpora-
tion, initiate a sale of the corporation, or engage in a change-of-control trans-
action. However, with respect to the latter two transactions, the Delaware
courts' failure to define clearly when they actually arise, coupled with its
seeming desire to limit Revlon, may provide public benefit companies ample
opportunity to conduct takeover-like activity while paying heed to non-share-
holder interests. Indeed, there is reason to believe that when directors of these
companies remain committed to their social or charitable missions, the direc-
tors may be able to consider these missions when consummating some trans-
actions. Hence, the claim that corporate law prevents these directors from
making decisions aimed at protecting a particular mission or group, even
during times of major transition, is tenuous at best.
C. Help on the Horizon: Constituency Statutes
The passage of constituency statutes also signals a movement toward an
expansion of the interests that directors can consider. Constituency statutes
represent a response to the perceived negative impact corporate takeovers
have on employees, creditors, and other members of the community.2" As
expressed previously, corporate takeovers involving a break-up or major
reorganization of the corporation often displace employees and jeopardize
creditors' positions."' State leaders enacted constituency statutes to enable
directors to consider the concerns of employees, creditors, and others who
may be impacted negatively by corporate takeovers." 9 Though enacted in
response to takeovers, constituency statutes have swung the pendulum in the
direction of the social entity concept by permitting directors to evaluate the
concerns of groups other than shareholders.28 0 As a consequence, this legisla-
277. See Orts, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that constituency statutes were "born legisla-
tively as part-and-parcel of the spate of state antitakeover statutes").
278. See id. (noting common belief that takeover market "caused, or at least significantly
facilitated a geographical redistribution of wealth, as well as an attendant loss ofjobs").
279. See id. (noting that state legislatures passed constituency statutes largely in response
to constituents who perceived hostile takeovers negatively).
280. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 12, at 276 (stating that social entity concept "animates"
constituency statutes); Mitchell, supra note 13, at 610 (noting that non-shareholder constituency
statutes are "the most obvious feature of the reordering of the corporate legal landscape").
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tion enables directors of public benefit corporations to more effectively take
into account the interests of their beneficiaries. Of course, not all states have
adopted these statutes.sI States that do not have this legislation may be more
restrictive of public-benefit companies in their range of considerations. The
most obvious and problematic exception is Delaware, which has yet to enact
a statute.8 2 Given that most large public companies - including most of the
large education and hospital companies - are incorporated in Delaware, 3 the
absence of a statute in Delaware significantly moderates the impact of these
statutes on corporate law. However, these statutes reflect an important
legislative shift toward an acceptance of the social entity model of the corpo-
ration and, as a consequence, one cannot ignore their impact. 4
1. Content of Constituency Statutes
To date, thirty-two states have enacted some form of constituency
statute. 5 These statutes vary in the kind of groups or interests directors may
consider, although all have the unifying goal of broadening the concerns to
which directors can respond.2" 6 Some statutes apply only to a specific group
281. See infra note 285 (detailing states that have passed constituency statutes).
282. Orts, supra note 11, at 74.
283. See supra note 122 (discussing abundance of companies that have incorporated in
Delaware).
284. See supra note 280 (discussing how constituency statutes promote social entity con-
cept).
285. As of June 2001, the following states each had adopted some form of constituency
statute: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (West 1996); CONN. OEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 1997);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830 (West 2001); GA. CODEANN. § 14-2-202 (Supp. 2001); HAw. REV.
STAT. §414-221 (Supp.2001);IDAHoCoDE § 30-1602(Michie 1999); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN.
5/8.85 (West 1993); IND. CODEANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B
(West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210 (Michie Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:92 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 2001); MD. CODE. ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS. § 2-104(9) (Supp. 2001); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp.
2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West Supp. 2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (2001);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (Supp. 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.138 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35
(Michie 2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
19.1-50 (2001); OHIO REv. CODEANN. § 1701.59 (West Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357
(1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. I IA, § 8.30 (Supp. 2001); VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-727.1 (Michie 1999);WIS. STAT.ANN.
§ 180.0827 (West 1992); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (Michie 2001).
286. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Con-
stituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1086-88 (2000) (stating that purpose and effect of
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of constituents such as employees, suppliers, customers, and the local commu-
nity."' Others enable directors to consider a broader array of interests - from
those related to customers and suppliers to those impacting "the economy of
the state and nation."288 Pennsylvania, the first to pass constituency legisla-
tion, adopted a broad statute, providing that, in discharging the duties of their
respective positions, directors may consider,
to the extent they deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such
action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and credi-
tors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located, [;]
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation...
[;and]...
(4) All other pertinent factors.2s
In essence, all constituency statutes have two significant impacts upon
public benefit companies. First, the statutes explicitly sanction management
decisions that consider non-shareholder interests. Second, these statutes
overrule Revlon-like decisions in the states in which they apply.2 °
constituency statutes is to expand criterion on which directors may rely); Orts, supra note 11,
at 26-27 (stating that constituency statutes allow directors to consider "expanded group of
interests").
287. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (Michie 1999).
288. States with such a broad pronouncement include Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Vermont (which includes economy of the state, region, and nation), and Wyoming. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.0830 (West 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221 (Supp. 2001); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B.12-210 (Michie Supp. 2001); MASS. OEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138 (2001); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (Michie 2001);N.D. CENT.CODE § 10-19.1-50 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59 (West Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (1999); S.D. CODIlEDLAws § 47-
33-4 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 IA, § 8.30
(Supp. 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (Michie 2001).
289. 15 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (West 1995).
290. Only the Connecticut statute requires directors to consider non-shareholder interests.
See CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 2000) (stating "the director shall consider" interests
of variety of different groups including employees, creditors, customers, community, and society
as well as "any factors directors reasonably believe to be in the bests interests of the corpora-
tion"). All of the other constituency statutes are permissive in nature. Some have asserted that
the permissive nature of the statutes indicates a lack of "a true commitment by state legislatures
to ensure corporate decision-making includes consideration of stakeholders." Adams &
Matheson, supra note 286, at 1120. However, the fact that most of these statutes are permissive
is not determinative for purposes, of this Article. This Article seeks to determine the extent to
which these statutes, and corporate law in general, enables directs greater flexibility to make
decisions unrelated to shareholder interests, not whether or not directors will be required to
make these decisions.
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2. Conduct Permitted by Constituency Statutes
In the context of ordinary business decisions, constituency statutes may
be viewed as a codification of the duty amplified in Wrigley.29' Almost three-
fourths of constituency statutes permit directors to consider the long-term
interests of shareholders and the corporation when making their decisions.2"
In this respect, these statutes are consistent with judicial opinions like Wrigley
that allow a director to consider community interests even when there is a less
than immediate advantage for the shareholders. Based on these statutes,
directors of public benefit corporations may be free to continue operation of
a relatively under-performing school or continue providing charitable services
within a hospital, as long as they can articulate a reason why continuation may
increase the value of the shareholders' interests in the long term. Thus, some
view these statutes as providing explicit legislative sanction for conduct
already permitted by judicial opinions.293
However, some statutes appear to go further than court decisions such as
Wrigley and allow directors to consider other groups' interests without tying
them to the concerns of shareholders. Nearly all of the statutes include
"community" or "community interests" as one of the factors a director may
consider when making a decision with respect to the corporation.294 Some
states, like Pennsylvania, also have a catch-all provision enabling directors to
consider "all other pertinent factors" when making decisions.29 Then too, a
291. Cf. William J. Carney, DoesDefining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385,
387 (1990) (arguing that enlightened management "properly considers the interest of these
constituencies when pursuing shareholder welfare"); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis
of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 23, 35-36 (1991) (reasoning that constituency statutes
will be beneficial if they simply prevent courts from intruding in internal corporate decisions
that do not implicate director or manager self-interest).
292. Twenty-three of the thirty-two states with constituency statutes refer to the long-term
interests of shareholders as a factor to be considered by directors.
293. See, e.g., Adams & Matheson, supra note 286, at 1092 ("Constituency statutes do not
represent a new invention attempting to penetrate corporate legal regimes, but instead constitute
an innovative means to express the ideals embraced by corporate America throughout the
twentieth century.").
294. Twenty-nine of the thirty-two state statutes refer to community interests. States not
referring to community interests are Arizona, New Jersey, and Virginia.
295. In addition to Pennsylvania, several other states have statutes that enable directors to
consider "any other relevant factor" in their decision-making process. These include Georgia,
GA. CODE. ANN. § 14-2-202(bX5) (1994) (permitting directors to consider all pertinent factors);
Illinois, 805 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/8.85 (West 1993) (same); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-
1(d) (Michie Repl. 1999) (same); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp.
2001-2002) (same); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 60.357 (1999) (same); Tennessee, TENN4. CODE
ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995) (same); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992)
(same); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (Michie 2001) (same).
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few states do not require directors to regard explicitly the interests of any one
group as dominant or controlling.2" Even statutes that do not contain this
language do not require that a director consider non-shareholder interests in
conjunction with shareholder concerns."9  Therefore, these statutes may
provide wider discretion than cases like Wrigley, which leave doubt as to how
far directors can pursue other interests when they are not linked to the share-
holders.
These statutes appear to sanction precisely the kind of action that oppo-
nents of privatization claim that case law would not permit for-profit compa-
nies to take, and they confirm the general flexibility that directors have.
Certainly, the definition of community or community interests that is referred
to in most of these statutes would encompass the interests of students and
patients who are served by public benefit companies. This definition also may
include consideration of interests broader than that of the immediate benefi-
ciaries. For example, these statutes would allow the directors of a public
benefit hospital to consider the fact that a hospital closure would strain the
economic resources of other hospitals within their community. These statutes
also appear to allow directors to consider these interests divorced from
shareholder concerns. In this regard, directors of public benefit corporations
would have the freedom to make decisions that subordinate those concerns.
In the takeover context, constituency statutes also serve to overrule
Revlon-like decisions in the states in which the statutes apply. Not only were
the statutes enacted in response to Delaware's stance on defensive measures
during a takeover,2" but almost one-third of the statutes apply only in the
takeover context.299 These statutes allow directors to consider non-share
296. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Michie Repl. 1999) (noting that directors may
consider various interests); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108 (West 1999) (same); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1715(aX4) (West 1995) (same). The Pennsylvania statute, for example, provides
that in considering the best interests of the corporation or the effects of any of its actions,
directors shall not be required to regard any interests of any particular group as dominant or
controlling. Id. § 1715(b).
297. As an example, the Iowa statute allows directors to consider customers and then, as
a separate factor, allows directors to consider the long-term and short-term interests of the
corporation. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108(lXa), (c) (West 1999) (allowing directors to
consider various factors in making decisions).
298. See Orts, supra note 11, at 24-25 (discussing sources of anti-takeover legislation).
299. This includes Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108 (West 1999); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:92(g) (West 1994); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'Ns § 2-104(9)
(Repl. 1999); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2001); New Jersey, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West Supp. 2001); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 60.357 (1988); South Dakota,
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (Michic 2000), and Tennessee, TENN. CODEANN. § 48-103-204
(1995). South Dakota is the only statute that applies to a slightly broader context than a
tskeover. That statute applies to directors' conduct in situations in which a "change of control"
is involved. This is arguably more extensive than just a takeover contest, possibly including a
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holder interests during all phases of a takeover struggle, including the stage
at which directors contemplate a break-up or reorganization of the corpora-
tion. Revlon may not permit this, because Revlon requires that once a break-
up occurs, shareholders' interests must predominate in directors' decisions. °
Thus, in Minnesota, the site of incorporation for one of the education compa-
nies, Tesseract, 30 a director may structure a takeover involving the break up
of the company while taking into account more than the financial value the
transaction has for the shareholder. Therefore, directors governed by constitu-
ency statutes will have wider latitude to make decisions consistent with their
mission, regardless of the context.
IV Empirical Evidence on Post-Conversion Conduct
Of course, while corporate fiduciary law may permit directors of public
benefit companies to favor the interests of their beneficiaries to shareholders,
it does not require directors to make those decisions. As a consequence, it is
not clear which conception of the corporation dominates director decision-
making in practice. This section analyzes the empirical data related to post
conversion conduct to determine if in fact directors have behaved in a manner
more consistent with the shareholder primacy model than the social entity
model.
Unfortunately, the evidence on this issue is equivocal, and for the most
part, anecdotal. Opponents of privatization claim that directors, when con-
fronted with the decision whether to provide services for students and needy
patients or to maximize profits, will attend to their bottom line at the expense
of these groups. There is evidence to support this position.3" However, those
who claim that for-profit companies have been able to provide top-quality
services, without compromising companies' commitment to its public benefi-
ciaries, dispute this evidence. As with most situations, the truth probably lies
somewhere in the middle.
sale of a controlling block of shares. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc., 637 A.2d 34,46 (Del. 1993) (distinguishing between change of control when more than
50% of shares change ownership from situation in which one corporation takes over operating
control of another).
300. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (reaffirming shareholder primacy doctrine in context of break-up). Even under Time,
directors had not committed to an actual break-up of the company and presumably if they had,
then Revlon duties would have attached requiring directors to abandon any strategy that did not
relate to maximizing shareholder profit. See, e.g., Paramount, 637 A.2d at 47 (noting that one
of two situations which implicate Revlon is when corporation effects business reorganization
involving break-up of company).
301. TESSERACT QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 68.
302. See infra notes 308-13 and accompanying text (discussing studies showing decreased
charity care after for-profit conversion).
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It is no easy task to determine whether or not public benefit companies
have remained committed to their charitable or social mission. Indeed,
various studies use different measures of success that in turn can impact the
outcome of the analysis greatly. This problem surfaces both in healthcare and
in education. In the context of hospitals, experts have disagreed about what
constitutes charitable services.3"3 Some studies define charitable services
narrowly to mean only charity care - the provision of care to patients who
cannot pay and from whom the hospital has no expectation of repayment.30"
Other studies focus on uncompensated care, which includes both charity care
and so called "bad debt" (the amount of billed charges left unpaid by privately
insured or by others who were expected to pay).305 Still other studies take a
more expansive approach, including both uncompensated care as well as the
amount of additional community benefits that a hospital provides, such as the
provision of Medicaid and unprofitable services like emergency and trauma
care, bum care, and substance abuse treatment.3"6 This definitional problem
hampers a straightforward analysis of whether for-profit hospitals continue to
provide charitable services.
A similar problem appears in the education context. In recent years, it
has become common to equate the success of a school with its students'
ability to achieve high marks on standardized tests. This assessment is not the
only, nor arguably even the most reliable, indicator of a school's success."
303. See infra note 305.
304. See NEEDLEMAN, CONVERSION REVIEW, supra note 21, at 25 (noting difference
between charity care and uncompensated care).
305. Most of the studies have focused on uncompensated care. See, e.g., Kenneth E.
Thorpe et al., Hospital Conversions, Margins, and the Provision of Uncompensated Care,
HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2000, at 189 n.7 (noting that bulk of empirical research completed on
uncompensated care has focused on charity care and bad debt); Gary Young & Kamal R. Desai,
Nonprofit Hospital Conversions and Community Benefits: New Evidence From Three States,
HEALTH AFF., SeptiOct. 1999, at 146 (investigating short- and long-term community impacts
of non-profit hospital conversions). Apparently hospitals are inconsistent in differentiating
between charity care and uncompensated care, and, thus, most studies define charitable services
in terms of uncompensated care. See NEEDIEMAN, CONVERSION REVIEW, supra note 21, at 25
(noting that uncompensated care includes both charity care and bad debt).
306. See Nicholson et al., supra note 30, at 168-69 (developing new, more expansive
method for defining community benefits to include uncompensated care, other unbilled public-
good services, losses on medical research and Medicare and Medicaid shortfalls); Young &
Desai, supra note 305, at 148 (utilizing four indicators of community benefits: uncompensated
care, net prices, unprofitable services, and community representation on board).
307. Indeed, many have opposed the use of these assessments, arguing that they cannot
capture accurately the educational experience. See, e.g., Rachel Smolkin, The Stakes Are High
for Testers and Testees, PrIrsBURGH POsT-GAzETrE, Aug. 27, 2000, at Al (noting opponents
who argue that decisions that impact students' futures should not rest on test scores alone and
that tests encourage rote memorization rather than creative thinking and problem solving).
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Analysis of this data must acknowledge the limits of many of the yardsticks
we use to measure success both in hospitals and at schools.
A. Evidence on the Post-Conversion Behavior of For-Profit Hospitals
With regard to hospitals, proponents claim that the focus on profit-
making will deter administrators of public benefit companies from providing
charitable services. As an example of this behavior, a report issued in 1999
by the Consumers Union found that, between 1993 and 1998, the level of
charity care decreased significantly in four out of five California hospitals
after their switch to for-profit status."0 In fact, while only one hospital's
charity care increased by 71%, the remaining four showed decreases in charity
care, with one hospital's level of charity care decreasing 94%.3 Similarly,
another nationwide study of hospital conversions between 1990 and 1997,
conducted by researchers at Emory University's School of Public Health,
concluded that uncompensated care levels declined when nonprofit hospitals
converted to for-profit status.3 10 That study found that, when a not-for-profit
converted to for-profit status, uncompensated care fell from 5.3% to 4.7% of
the total expenses of hospitals, amounting to an average of $400,000 less that
was spent on uncompensated care .3 1  This number decreased further for
public hospital conversions, falling by 2.7% or approximately $800,000 less
per year spent on uncompensated care.312  The study concluded with the
warning that "a continued rise in the number of for-profit hospitals could
reduce the willingness or even the capacity of hospitals to finance care for
308. See JUuOMATEO, JR. &JADEROSS1,WH1TKNIOIfTsORTROJANHORSES? APoUcY
AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATIONs IN CALIFORNIA, at iv
(1999), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/health/white knight.htm (finding decline
in charity care in absence of "tight charity-care, service, and patient volume commitments").
The study reviewed ten hospital conversions occurring during the time period, but only found
sufficient data on five of them. The hospitals included in the study were: Sacred Heart,
Hanford; Centinela Hospital, Inglewood; Good Samaritan, San Jose; United Western Medical
Center, Santa Ana; United Western Medical Center, Anaheim; Pacific Hospital of Long Beach;
Riverside Community Hospital, Riverside; Queen of Angels, Los Angeles; Watsonville
Community Hospital, Watsonville; and Sharp Healthcare, Murrieta. Id. at ii.
309. Id. at iv. The report found that United Western Medical Center of Santa Ana sus-
tained a 94% decline. Good Samaritan in San Jose had an 88% decrease in charity-care between
its last year as a nonprofit and its first year as a for-profit, United Western Medical Center of
Anaheim showed an 84% decline, and at Riverside Community Hospital, charity-care declined
by 31%. Only Pacific Hospital of Long Beach revealed an increase in charity-care by 71%. Id.
at v.
310. See Thorpe et al., supra note 305, at 192 (concurring with other national studies based
on AHA data). The study identified 431 hospital conversions during that period, of which 127
converted from not-for-profit to for-profit status. Id. at 189.
311. Id. at 191.
312. Id.
DIRECTORS' OBLIGATIONS TO NON-SHAREHOLDERS
those who are unable to pay for it."3' 3 This dire warning suggests that direc-
tors of these hospitals have not and will not be able to consider adequately the
interests of their more needy beneficiaries. This assessment seems to support
the notion that the social entity model of the corporation has not guided
directors' conduct.
Other studies undermine this notion and indicate that the level of charity
care at for-profit hospitals remains relatively the same after conversion from
nonprofit hospitals.3"4 For example, a study of hospital conversions over a 12-
year period in California found that the level of hospital charity care remained
relatively the same throughout the period of the study.3"' Similarly, a 1999
report conducted by researchers at Boston University's School of Public
Health, focusing on conversion activity in three states between 1981 and 1995,
found little proof that conversions threatened the provision of uncompensated
care and community benefits, including the provision of emergency and
trauma care, neonatal care, bum care, and substance abuse treatment.316 The
study also found little difference in the prices that for-profits charged for
services after they converted." 7 Additionally, a study of Massachusetts
hospitals conducted by Jack Needleman, a professor of economics and health
policy at Harvard's School of Public Health, echoes these findings, conclud-
ing that levels of uncompensated care do not decline after a conversion to for-
profit status."3 Each of these studies is consistent with earlier, more limited
studies that suggested the absence of any decline in uncompensated services
at hospitals after their switch to for-profit status.3 9 Based on these studies,
313. Id.
314. See Hyman, supra note 22, at 758 (arguing that many for-profit hospitals provide
substantial charity care).
315. See Oary J. Young et al., Does the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals Threaten Health Care
for the Poor, 16 HEALTH AFF., Jan/Feb 1997, at 137-41 (noting that acquisition of non-profit
hospitals by investor-owned corporations does not lead uniformly to less uncompensated care).
316. See Young & Dessi, supra note 305, at 147-48 (finding that conversions do not have
appreciable impact on community benefits). The study reviewed forty-three conversions in
California, Florida, and Texas. Of these conversions, twenty occurred in California, fifteen in
Florida, and eight in Texas. These states experienced some of the highest levels of conversion
activity during this period. Id. at 147.
317. See id. at 152 (concluding that conversions do not reduce community benefits relative
to uncompensated care, prices, or services).
318. See NEEDLEMAN, CONVESION REVIEW, supra note 21, at 26 (noting that uncompen-
sated care may not be at risk in conversion to for-profit status). Needleman found that after
conversion, neither HCA nor Tenet ended community services identified as important prior to
their conversion. See id. at 29 (discussing effects of HCA and Tenet conversions to for-profit
entities).
319. See id. at 26 (reviewing results of earlier studies in California and Florida); Young
& Desai, supra note 305, at 152 (noting that findings of study are consistent with earlier, more
limited research).
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some scholars argue that claims about post-conversion conduct are over-
stated. 20 At the very least, these findings provide evidence that directors
serve their public constituents and make decisions in a manner consistent with
the social entity model of the corporation.
In furtherance of this notion, some analysts note that public benefit
hospitals provide important community services that make it difficult to assess
whether not-for-profit or for-profit managers provide more community bene-
fits. Indeed, some commentators point out that by paying taxes, unlike their
nonprofit counterparts, for-profit hospitals provide benefits in the form of
additional revenue for the local community.32" ' The Boston University study
also pointed out that conversions have helped to preserve some hospitals that
might have closed due to poor financial performance. 22 Moreover, even the
Emory study, which found reductions in uncompensated care nationwide,
noted that converted hospitals not only pay taxes, but also often create charita-
ble foundations from the sale of the nonprofits assets. 23 The study concluded
that this behavior makes it "uncertain whether more or fewer funds flow to a
community as a result of an ownership conversion.1
3 4
In the face of the conflicting evidence, it may be most accurate to con-
clude that "[t]he debate over the benefits of nonprofit health care entities
versus for-profit entities is long standing and has not been resolved in any
meaningful way."32 Indeed, it does not appear that privatization has triggered
the significant reduction in the levels of charity care provided by hospitals as
opponents predicted. This may be attributable to the fact that nonprofit
hospitals do not provide as high a level of charity care prior to their conver-
sion as some presume. 26 Several studies reveal that over the years, the level
320. See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 22, at 756-62 (citing studies that showed evidence that
non-profit and for-profit hospitals behave similarly).
321. See id. at 761 (noting that if one considers taxes paid by for-profit hospitals, non-
profit hospitals provide far less community benefits); Claxton et al., supra note 20, at 17 (noting
that if one factors in taxes paid by for-profit firms, then community benefits they provide would
exceed those provided by nonprofits); Young & Desai, supra note 305, at 154 (recognizing that
non-profit conversions offer benefits in form of new company assuming local taxes).
322. Young & Desai, supra note 305, at 154.
323. See Thorpe et al., supra note 305, at 192 (noting uncertainty over whether more funds
flow to community as result of ownership conversion).
324. Id.
325. Bisesi, supra note 6, at 845. Similarly, Needleman concludes that while the levels of
charity care and uncompensated care see no real change, the findings are mixed with respect to
community benefits, such as programs targeting the poor, and that they change from hospital
to hospital. See NEEDLEMAN, CONVERSION REVIEW, supra note 21, at 39 (noting impact of
conversion on poor and uninsured patients).
326. See Hyman, supra note 22, at 758 (noting that level of charity care provided by
nonprofit hospitals "provides disheartening news to those who believe nonprofit hospitals are
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decisions that maximize the interests of other groups regardless of the context.
Clearly Wrigley, Unocal, and even Paramount confirm the notion that the
duty to maximize shareholder value without regard to other interests applies
only in limited takeover settings. Because it is unclear ifthese companies will
be subject to takeover attempts, these settings may not even arise. More
specifically, even within the context of takeovers, the board can institute
defensive measures and engage in significant restructuring without regard to
Revlon. Revlon is implicated if directors agree to the break-up of the corpora-
tion, initiate a sale of the corporation, or engage in a change-of-control trans-
action. However, with respect to the latter two transactions, the Delaware
courts' failure to define clearly when they actually arise, coupled with its
seeming desire to limit Revlon, may provide public benefit companies ample
opportunity to conduct takeover-like activity while paying heed to non-share-
holder interests. Indeed, there is reason to believe that when directors of these
companies remain c ommitted to their social or charitable missions, the direc-
tors may be able to consider these missions when consunmming some trans-
actions. Hence, the claim that corporate law prevents these directors from
making decisions aimed at protecting a particular mission or group, even
during times of major transition, is tenuous at best.
C. Help on the Horizon: Constituency Statutes
The passage of constituency statutes also signals a movement toward an
expansion of the interests that directors can consider. Constituency statutes
represent a response to the perceived negative impact corporate takeovers
have on employees, creditors, and other members of the community.277  M
expressed previously, corporate takeovers involving a break-up or major
reorganization of the corporation often displace employees and jeopardize
creditors' positions. State leaders enacted constituency statutes to enable
directors to consider the concerns of employees, creditors, and others who
may be impacted negatively by corporate takeovers.2 9 Though enacted in
response to takeovers, constituency statutes have swung the pendulum in the
direction of the social entity concept by permitting directors to evaluate the
concerns of groups other than shareholders.2"0 As a consequence, this legisla-
277. See Orts, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that constituency statutes were "born legisla-
tively as part-and-parcel of the spate of state antitakeover statutes").
278. See id. (noting common belief that takeover market "caused, or at least significantly
facilitated a geographical redistribution of wealth, as well as an attendant loss ofjobs").
279. See id. (noting that state legislatures passed constituency statutes largely in response
to constituents who perceived hostile takeovers negatively).
280. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 12, at 276 (stating that social entity concept "animates"
constituency statutes); Mitchell, supra note 13, at 610 (noting that non-shareholder constituency
statutes are "the most obvious feature of the reordering of the corporate legal landscape").
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representing the majority of schools in operation for at least two years. 3 In
the study, AFT pinpointed at least three areas in which Edison has introduced
cost-cutting measures that apparently subordinated student interests in favor
of making a profit.3 First, the AFT report claims that when Edison hires
staff for its schools, it tends to favor beginning teachers, who are at the bottom
of the salary scale, over experienced teachers who receive higher salaries. 32
AFT argued that this practice is problematic. According to AFT, several
330. TRENDS, supra note 329, at 3. The states are California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minfiesota, and Texas.
331. See STUDENTACHIEVEMENT, supra note 329, at 17-23 (discussing Edison cost-cutting
measures). Some opponents of for-profit management of schools also complain that for-profit
managers of schools will inflate test scores in order to appear successful. See id. at 4 (suggest-
ing that Edison exaggerated test score gains). Indeed, this is one of the concerns raised by
Professor Solomon in his critique of privatization. See Solomon, supra note 48, at 924 (dis-
cussing criticisms of privatization). Currently there has been no evidence of such conduct on
the part of Edison. However, even if Edison does inflate scores and introduce some cost cutting
measures to ensure higher test scores, this practice may not stem from its desire to make profits
for its shareholders, but rather from other external pressures. Indeed, more and more states are
requiring public schools to administer tests that have tremendous consequences, including
whether teachers or administrators receive bonus pay or whether students advance to the next
grade. See Smolkin, supra note 307 (discussing effects of high-stakes standardized testing).
Like privately-managed schools, funding in public schools can be tied to test scores. Thus, in
California, schools that post the biggest gains in standardized test scores are eligible for large
monetary rewards, including $25,000 for teachers of high-achieving classes. Jessica Garrison,
Three 0.C. Schools Stand to MaW Out on Testing Bonuses, LA. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2000, at B4.
In other states, principals and teachers face the loss of their jobs if they fail to improve student
test scores. See Stephen Dinan, Schools Chief Tries to Spur Principals, WASH. TIMES, May 6,
1999, at C3 (noting public announcement by administrators that principals and teachers would
be replaced if they failed to improve test scores). These high-stakes exams create pressure on
students and teachers that may lead to conduct antithetical to the best interests of students. For
example, there have been many, allegations of cheating in the wake of these exams. These
allegations have arisen in Ohio, New York, Texas, and Maryland. See, e.g., Extra Credit,
WASH. POST, May 15, 2001, at A07 (discussing cheating and plagiarism by high-school
students). In fact it appears that cheating is a nationwide problem. A recent study of 4,500
students at twenty-five high schools across the country reveals the high level of cheating. See
id. (noting results of study by Rutgers University Professor Donald McCabe); Rutgers Study
Finds Extensive Cheating, BALT. SUN, Apr. 29, 2001, at 15B (same). Thus, more than 150
schools in California were accused of exempting students from exams so that they could obtain
better overall scores. Garrison, supra. These schools clearly sacrifice their educational goals
to show improvement on these tests. Hence, the fact that Edison may do so as well only
suggests that it has fallen victim to these same pressures, not that the for-profit corporation
compels directors to behave in this manner.
332. See STUDENT ACHIEVEENT, supra note 329, at 17-18 (noting that hiring preference
for beginning teachers keeps personnel costs down). For example, the AFT report notes that
in 1995-96, only 12% of the teachers in Edison's elementary school in Wichita had a master's
degree as compared to 47% of teachers in the rest of the district. Id. at 18. Also, in Edison's
Sherman elementary schools, 28% of the teachers were new compared to 7% in the remainder
of the district. Id.
DIRECTORS' OBLIGATIONS TO NON-SHAREHOLDERS
experts agree that teacher experience makes a big difference in student
achievement and that it is not beneficial for students to be taught by a majority
of less experienced teachers.333 However, AFT noted that the practice of
employing a large number of teachers with less experience keeps personnel
costs down.334 Consequently, AFT argued that Edison's hiring policy "sug-
gests that getting a skilled and experienced staff takes second place to keeping
costs down."
3 35
Second, AFT claimed that Edison appeared to have an unofficial policy
of raising its class size, which is "a big money saver." '336 The AFT report
notes that although few policy makers ever suggest increasing class size,
337
Edison schools tend to have larger than average class sizes.' Because Edison
gets paid based on the number of students it enrolls in its schools,339 increas-
ing class size may suggest that Edison has put profit-making goals above the
interests of its students.
Third, the AFT report indicates that Edison limits special education to
children who can spend most of their time in regular classes.' According to
AFT, there is considerable dispute about whether it is advantageous to educate
all special education children, regardless of the nature of their disability, in
regular classes.341 However, the AFT report states, "[w]hat no one disputes
is that mainstreaming special education students... is less expensive than
providing them with small classes and highly trained special education teach-
333. See id. at 17 (describing study by National Commission on Teaching and America's
Future that concluded that teacher expertise is "one of the most important factors" in determin-
ing student achievement- as well as studies by Ronald Ferguson in Texas and Alabama empha-
sizing importance of teacher experience).
334. Id. at 18. For example, the AFT report notes that at Edison's schools in Wichita,
personnel costs were 20% lower than the average costs for school district personnel. Id. The
AFT report points out that while teacher salaries at Edison are comparable to salaries elsewhere
in the district for the same level of experience, hiring beginning teachers means that Edison does
not have to pay the increased salary that more experience teachers receive. See id. at 17-18
(noting also that Edison's differentiatedstaffing means that younger, less experienced teachers
do much better financially than in other schools).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 19.
337. See id. (noting that Edison's average class size is high by national and local stan-
dards).
338. According to the AFT report, the average elementary school classroom in the United
States contains twenty-four students. Id. (noting that class size has changed little in thirty
years). However, in the Edison schools in Colorado, class sizes were up to 30 students, and at
one Edison school in Boston, the class size grew to 28. Id. at 20.
339. See id. at 15 (noting that Edison schools receive per-pupil funding).
340. Id. at 20.
341. See id. at 20-21 (pointing out that range of children classified as special education
students is enormous and that some suffer from severe emotional disturbances).
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ers."342 According to AFT, Edison's policies related to hiring, class size, and
special education enables Edison to save significant money. As a conse-
quence, these policies suggest that profit concerns rather than the best inter-
ests of Edison's student beneficiaries dictate Edison's management deci-
sions. 43 This assessment appears to confirm the primacy of a shareholder-
centered conception of the corporation as applied to Edison.
In response, Edison claimed that AFT misrepresented its education
program. First, Edison pointed out that it employed teachers across levels
of responsibility and that it depends on a range of teacher experience in its
schools.3 44  Edison also noted that it devotes substantial capital to profes-
sional development and that its longer teacher schedule and innovative
programs often attract less experienced teachers who tend to have greater
flexibility. 345 This practice negates the notion that Edison's management has
placed profit concerns above the interests of students. Second, claiming that
the AFT report is largely anecdotal, 346 Edison maintained that its class sizes
vary from community to community, with many of them following the local
norm and some of them falling under the average class size. 347 In Edison's
view, this variation does not suggest a pattern of cost-cutting, but rather a
pattern too general to draw substantive conclusions about Edison's policy in
this area.
348
Third, Edison disputed AFT's statement that its inclusion program saved
money on special education. 349 In contrast to AFT's assertion, Edison claimed
that experts do not agree that inclusion saves money. Instead, Edison main-
tained that "an effective inclusion program costs more money to implement
because special education teachers must support teachers in addition to special
342. Id. at 21. AFT reported that Edison's president indicated that Edison would save
money by educating special education students in regular classes. See id. (noting that Edison
president said that Edison would deliver excellent results in regular classroom setting).
343. See id. at 17 (noting that company's announced goal is to make profit for investors).
344. See EDISON RESPONSE, in TRENDS, supra note 329, at 13 (noting that Edison values
experienced teachers for necessary leadership roles).
345. See id. at 13 (noting that Edison schools attract young teachers because program
demands changes and younger teachers are more receptive to changes).
346. See id. at 13 (claiming that AFT failed to assess class sizes within twelve schools on
which report focused, but relied on newspaper accounts for its information).
347. Id. at 12. Edison points out that class sizes at some of its elementary schools in Texas
average twenty to twenty-four, while Edison's two schools in Michigan average seventeen
students per class. Edison notes that is class sizes "vary too much for such statistics to be
meaningful." Id.
348. See id. at 12 (noting that because Edison's class sizes vary, it makes little sense to
make comparisons to national average).
349. See id. at 12-13 (noting that experts agree that inclusion programs cost more to
implement because special education teachers must support teachers as well as students).
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needs students."310 Finally, Edison pointed out that its education program is
far richer in curriculum than many public schools and that Edison generally
puts more money into the .classroom than public school administrators.51
Edison's response suggests that its management has not subordinated student
interests in favor of making money.
More importantly, these studies suggest that it is too early - and perhaps
too difficult - to make a determination regarding the conduct of directors in
privately-managed education companies. Indeed, AFT noted that it has limited
evidence related to the cause of Edison's decisions and that "it would be unfair
to draw conclusions based on [this) limited evidence." 2 Also, both AFT and
Edison agreed on the need for further study. In fact, Edison has commissioned
an independent auditor to analyze the performance of its schools. 3 Even with
this additional study, it may be difficult to determine with any degree of
certainty whether or not managers of such schools pursue policies aimed at
saving money or at providing a quality education. This is especially true given
the disagreement about the types of policies that will produce a quality educa-
tion. Because of these limitations, it is difficult to draw any conclusions based
on the available empirical evidence in this area. Certainly, the forgoing evi-
dence does not reveal which conception of the corporation governs manager's
conduct in the context of privately-managed schools.
Conclusion
The analysis in this Article suggests that philosophical objections to
conversions of public benefit companies may be based on an inaccurate
conception of corporate fiduciary law. In the context of ordinary business
decisions, corporate law is very permissive and allows directors the freedom
to pursue the interests of non-shareholders even if pursuing these interests
does not maximize shareholder profits. This permissiveness stems in part
from the courts' reluctance to interfere with the decisions of directors as
indicated by the application of the business judgment rule. Furthermore, the
relative failure of courts to take action against directors based on a breach of
350. Id. at 13.
351. See id. at 5 (noting that Edison offers twice as much fine arts as most public schools,
superb character and ethics curriculum, Spanish language instruction for every child starting in
kindergarten, longer school day and year, and technology program that equips every teacher and
family with computer).
352. STUDENT AcHwVEmET, supra note 329, at 17. The AFT report concludes that it is
"too early to tell" if the problems highlighted by the report result from defects at particular
schools or from a pattern of cutting comers. Id. at 23.
353. Edison commissioned the RAND corporation. See TRENDs, supra note 329, at 9
(noting Edison's intent to provide continuous analysis of performance of its schools).
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their fiduciary duty to shareholders confirms this. Even in the takeover
context, in which shareholders and other group interests conflict, Delaware
courts allow directors to focus on non-shareholder concerns in all but the most
limited of circumstances. The director's ability to favor other groups even in
this context signals the dominance of the social entity model. Outside of
Delaware, constituency statutes go further, permitting directors to pay heed
to the concerns of non-shareholders in all contexts, including those related to
fundamental changes in the corporation. This suggests that the social entity
conception of the corporation has taken precedence over the shareholder
primacy model, or at the very least, that commentators overstate the domi-
nance of the shareholder-centered model.
Because the objection to privatization fails to appreciate corporate
fiduciary law concepts properly, this objection should not control the debate
about the desirability of for-profit education or healthcare. If the corporate
form does not constrain the choices directors must make in relation to their
beneficiaries, then we must explore more fundamentally whether or not these
entities can provide better, more efficient services to our students and patients.
Certainly, other forces, such as capital markets or voting, may cause directors
to pay heed to shareholder profit. Also, there may be other concerns with
privatization in these fields such as the possible erosion of civic values or the
possibility that it may undermine equal access to education." 4 In addition, it
may not be possible for these companies to make a profit, particularly in the
education market. However, although the evidence is mixed, it suggests that
profit-making may not be at odds with improving public education or obtain-
ing quality health care. If this is true, then perhaps we should focus on
providing mechanisms that accommodate and regulate the entrance of for-
profit companies into these fields, rather than attempting to reject their en-
trance wholesale. More importantly, given the mixed evidence on the results
of such endeavors and the general agreement that the healthcare and education
industries need change, we should abandon our myths about the for-profit
enterprise and weigh the arguments for privatization more carefully and
stringently before opposing what could be part of a realistic solution.
354. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 48, at 920-25 (explaining arguments against for-profit
management of schools).
